Trace the origins for the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s.
The rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s was the outgrowth of a long historical process. In simple terms, the roots of militarism laid with developments of the Meiji era, and the fruits blossomed with the failure of party politics by the end of the 1920s.
Legacies of the Meiji era - the rise of militarism in Japan can be traced
back in the century-old military tradition of the samurai. Hundreds of years
of rule by men-of-sword had made the people ready to accept the claims of militarists
to national leadership. Fundamentally, Japan had a strong tradition of unquestioned
obedience to authority. The spirit of Bushido had existed in the hearts of
the Japanese and it permeated into all social strata through the nation-wide
conscription army.
Furthermore, foreign threats emphasized the importance of militarism. Japan
in the 1850s had been forced to sign unequal treaties, and her independence
was threatened in an age of imperialism. These facts taught the Japanese the
realities of power politics — that “Might is Right.” As such,
the Meiji leaders, mostly ex-samurai, learnt the necessity of a strong military
force. In time, they carried out important military reforms and created an
army second only to Germany in the world. Inevitably, the military services
were to have decisive influence in the nation’s affairs.
Institutional loopholes helped to increase the influence of the militarists.
The Meiji Constitution 1889 gave autonomy to the armed services. It stated
that the services had the right of direct access to the emperor, and thus bypassing
the government should it become necessary to do so. A second loophole was the
1900 decree. In that decree, it established the rule that only serving generals
and admirals could become Ministers of War and of the Navy. As such, the army
and navy could wreck a government which was against their interests by refusing
to supply it with army or navy ministers. These institutional loopholes, no
doubt, encouraged the growth of military influence and autonomy.
Another factor that strengthened the tradition of militarism was Japan’s
victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. These two victories
brought great benefits to Japan - in terms of money and territorial gains
as well as international status. These gave great prestige to the militarists
and taught the Japanese a lesson that war was the best instrument to further
national interest and it paid high dividends. In short, victories justified
the advocates of militarism and expansion.
Japan’s overseas expansion became necessary with the successful Meiji
modernization. Significant economic advances were made, especially in industrialization
and population growth. These developments pointed to the search for living
space, raw materials, markets and the like from abroad. The Asian mainland,
in particular, China and Korea, became Japan’s primary target for expansion.
Meiji leaders, for the sake of national unity, ardently cultivated an emperor-centered
nationalism among Japanese minds. It placed the Emperor in an unchallenged
position. Thus, whoever acted in the name of the emperor could control the
destiny of Japan. In theory, the armed forces were the personal army and navy
of the emperor, and therefore were qualified to speak for the emperor. By making
use of this absolute obedience to the emperor and the nation, the army started
to carry out aggression in the 1930s, believing that this served the will of
the emperor and the nation’s interest.
A side-effect of this fanatical devotion to the emperor was the growth of ultra-nationalism.
A number of extremist societies such as the Black Dragon Society fanned up
the sentiment of Japan’s superiority in the world by virtue of its divine
origins. They strongly advocated militarism and imperialism.
All the above were underlying factors that enabled the rise of militarism in
the 1930s. For the time being, the Meiji oligarchs as a group could hold the
militarists at bay. With the fading out of the oligarchs, however, no political
group was strong enough to play a similar role. As a matter of fact, party
politicians failed disastrously to stop the rise of militarist influence by
the early 1930s.
Failure of party government - despite its achievements in
the earlier years, the failure of party government became apparent by the late
1920s. This failure
of the parties to provide national leadership gave the militarists their chance
to rise to power.
As we have seen in earlier section, the failure of party governments derived
partly from its own weaknesses: internal disunity, corruption, no mass support,
and
economic failures.
There was another side of the story. In foreign affairs, there was strong reaction
among the army officers against the “weak-kneed” diplomacy of the
party governments. The military men resented the reduction in size of the armed
forces and regarded Foreign Minister Shidehara’s policy of improving
relations with China as a sign of weakness. They were especially unhappy with
the 1930 London Naval Disarmament Conference in which Japan agreed to a naval
inferiority relative to Britain and the United States. On this account, the
Prime Minister was assassinated by an extremist.
One of the most influential nationalist extremists was Kita Ikki who advocated
an economic and social revolution led by the militarists. He also advocated
the conquest of such areas as Manchuria and Siberia because Japan lacked natural
resources and living space. His ideas provided a programme of action for the
militarists. The influence of Kita was acknowledged in the Showa Restoration
movement in the early 1930s. The concept of Showa Restoration envisaged the
return of power from the parties and zaibatsu to the emperor and militiarists
who served better the nation’s interests.
Circumstances favourable to the rise of militarism - by the
late 1920s., a number of developments accelerated the rise of militarism in
Japan.
In the first place, China by 1928 was on the verge of being unified by Chiang
Kai-shek. A unified and strong China could threaten Japan’s position
in Manchuria where the Kwangtung Army was stationed. Apparently, the Nanking
government was trying to bring Manchuria back into China’s control. The
Manchurian warlord, Chang Hsueh-liang defied Japan by associating himself with
the Nanking government. In the eye of the militarists, Japan had to act fast
in order to safeguard her vested interests. Consequently, in September 1931,
the Kwangtung Army took independent action and seized control of Manchuria.
Another significant factor was the effects of the Great Depression on Japan’s
economy. This world-wide depression led to a collapse of international trade
because each country raised protective tariffs to protect her own interests.
This development was fatal to Japan’s economy which depended heavily
on export trade. Thus, between 1929 and 1931, Japan’s exports dropped
50%, unemployment reached 3 million, and peasants’ real income dropped
one-third as a result of falling prices for silk. Then, there was a failure
of rice crop in 1932. Such rural distresses intensified the discontents of
the army officers, many of whom had connections with the rural population.
They blamed the party governments in power and believed that parliamentary
policies were ruining Japan. Consequently, there was a popular support for
military adventures. Many Japanese believed that overseas expansion was an
effective solution to economic problems. In short, the economic crisis made
the nation desperate for military expansion. Thus took place the Manchurian
Incident in 1931.
Japan’s expansionism was not an isolated event. In Europe, Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy also undertook such a course in the 1930s. Their aggressive
actions echoed and reinforced each other’s, thereby drawing these three
countries closer together. By 1940, the Axis Alliance took shape and this became
an important factor for the outbreak of the Second World War.