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27. Examine critically Sino-Japanese relations in the 1930s.
Sino-Japanese relation in the 1920s was on the whole cordial and peaceful. Important highlights included Japan's acceptance of the Nine Power Treaty in the Washington Conference and her return of Shantung to China.
By the late 1920s, however, there were ominous signs of change. A number of incidents took place as a result of the likely unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek which was seen by the Japanese militarists as a threat to their interests in China.
Prelude to Manchurian Incident 1928-31 - Between April 1927 and July 1929, General Tanaka Giichi of Seiyukai was in office. His cabinet adopted a tougher policy towards China. In 1928, two incidents poisoned Sino-Japanese relation. The first was the Tsinan Incident in April. Japanese troops at Tsinan in Shantung province blocked the expeditionary forces of Chiang Kai-shek which were moving towards Peking. The second was the murder of Chang Tso-lin in June. Chang, the Chinese warlord of Manchuria, was killed in a train-explosion engineered by Japanese officers of the Kwangtung Army. This incident brought Tanaka into conflict with the high command because his demands for disciplinary action were rejected. And so indiscipline was overlooked and an evil precedent established.
On the other hand, Chang Hsueh-liang refused to accept Tanaka's "advice" not to join force with Chiang Kai-shek. Instead, Chang pledged allegiance to the Nationalist government at Nanking in July 1928 and hoisted its flag over all Manchuria in December. As the year 1929 opened, much of China was being unified under Chiang. Such a development upset many Japanese, especially the Kwangtung Army, who felt their interests in Manchuria threatened.
Manchurian Incident 1931 - The attachment of the Kwangtung Army and of Japan as a whole to Manchuria was of long standing. Thousands of lives had died in the Russo-Japanese War for the sake of Manchuria. That region, militarily, became a buffer against Russian power in the north; and ideologically, served to contain communism. Economically, Japan had invested heavily, especially with the South Manchurian Railway. There were also a million Japanese subjects in Manchuria. Meanwhile, Chang Hsueh-liang, having associated himself with the Nanking government, tried to regain China's rights in Manchuria. For instance, he waged an economic warfare against the Japanese by the construction of lines competing with the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway system.
Faced with this challenge, no important group in Japan considered withdrawing. Action was necessary if Japan's special position in Manchuria were to be maintained. In particular, the Kwangtung Army regarded 1931 propitious for action. China was deeply affected by domestic disorder and natural disaster. The Nanking government was involved in civil strife and with the communist threat. Japan was seriously affected by the Great Depression, and overseas expansion seemed like a suitable remedy. Internationally, the western powers were too preoccupied with economic difficulties at home to block Japan's aggression.
So in the summer of 1931 a plan was worked out by members of the General Staff in both Tokyo and Manchuria at the back of the government for the occupation of Mukden, to be followed by the seizure of Manchuria. On September 18, the plan was put into effect by the Kwangtung Army. Mukden, Changchun and Kirin were occupied within a few days. With reinforcements arriving from Korea, the whole of Manchuria was occupied in the next three months.
Such aggression of the "men-on-the-spot" presented Tokyo with a series of fait accomplis. At home, there was a wave of nationalist emotion endorsing the action. Abroad, there was widespread condemnation. China appealed to the League of Nations which sent the Lytton Commission to investigate the case. Meanwhile, early in 1932, hostilities broke out between Chinese and Japanese troops at Shanghai. In March, the Kwangtung Army created a puppet government in Manchuria - Manchukuo - with Pu Yi as the emperor of this Japanese creation. When the Lytton Report condemned Japan's aggression, she withdrew from the League of Nations in March 1933.
At the beginning of 1933, the Japanese army resumed operations and seized Jehol. In May, the Japanese advance was brought to a halt by the Tangku Truce which created a demilitarized zone between Peking and the Manchurian border. In effect, the defense of Peking and Tientsin was lost.
Detachment of North China - The Japanese strategy now called for the detachment of north China piece by piece through encouraging "autonomous movements". The formation of buffer zones in this region would protect the Japanese rear in Manchuria from surprise attacks. Thus, they stepped up their political and economic penetration in the demilitarized zone. They also sponsored an autonomous movement of the five northern provinces of Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Shantung. In December 1935, they created an Eastern Hopeh Autonomous Council. The Chinese government countered with the creation of a Hopeh-Chahar Political Council.
Simultaneously, Japan proposed the terms for a general agreement in October 1935: China's recognition of Manchukuo, suppression of anti-Japanese activities in China, and an anti-communist Sino-Japanese alliance. The Nanking government refused to accept these terms. A second ro nd of negotiations in 1936 also achieved nothing.
Sino-Japanese War 1937- For all the advances that Japan had made in Manchuria and north China, the Nationalist government refused to come to terms. Chiang Kai-shek persistently rejected Japanese overtures for compromises and he finally reached an agreement with the Chinese communists at the end of 1936 (after the Sian Incident) on making a united front against Japan.
The Japanese high command was more and more inclined to further aggression on China. An adventurous foreign policy could ease political tensions building up at home; overwhelm opposition of the political parties; satisfy the agitations of junior officers; and accomplish Japan's "mission" on the mainland.
In July 1937, fighting broke out near Peking between Japanese and Chinese troops. This Marco Polo Bridge Incident soon developed into an invasion of China. In August, fighting began in Shanghai. Soon, undeclared war raged in China proper. The Chinese capital, Nanking, fell into Japanese hands in December.
In late 1937, Germany offered to mediate. The Japanese demanded the suppression of anti-Japanese activities in China, the payment of reparation, the agreement of economic co-operation with Japan and Manchukuo, and the acceptance of demilitarized zones with autonomous agencies in them. Chiang flatly rejected this peace overture.
In the meantime, the Nationalist government withdrew to the interior, making a new capital at Chungking. Its strategy was "to trade space for time." Both Chiang and the Chinese communists continued to rage a bitter guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas which proved to be a mounting drain of Japanese resources.
The Japanese, on their part, launched offensives to increase their territorial gains. By the end of 1938, Japanese troops controlled all the wealthiest and most heavily populated parts of China. By then, Konoe, Japan's Prime Minister, proclaimed a "New Order in East Asia" - meaning a political, economic and cultural union of Japan, Manchukuo and China.
Since the war was coming to a stalemate, the Japanese created puppet governments in China to help administer the conquered territories. Some Chinese politicians, for various reasons, defected to the Japanese side. Wang Ching-wei, a powerful member of the Kuomintang, having failed to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to accept Japan's peace terms, escaped first to Indo-China and then to Shanghai. In March 1940, he set up a puppet regime at Nanking which the Japanese claimed to be the only official government of China.
Conclusion - Between July 1937 and December 1941, China fought alone. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour changed the character of the China war. Anglo-American declarations of war against Japan and similar action of China against the Axis Powers turned the war into part of a worldwide struggle against aggression.
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28. Give an outline of Japan's foreign policies in the 1930s.
In foreign affairs, the period of "Dark Valley" in Japan's history was marked by a series of overseas aggression which culminated in the outbreak of the Pacific War by the end of 1941.
Aggression on China - for details of Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 1930s, see previous question.
Japan's aggression on China was an indirect attack on the interests of the western nations and the United States in that country. Moreover, it was a violation of collective security as represented by the League of Nations, Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact. At times, there were specific issues that infuriated these countries such as the Panay and Ladybird incidents in 1937. All these helped to nurse an anti-Japanese sentiment.
Yet, none of these countries, for various reasons, was willing to take any positive steps against Japan for the sake of China. It was only with a change in Japan's policies which began to threaten them more directly that they rose to action.
Abandonment of international obligations - the first act was Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 which condemned her aggression on Manchuria. Then, at the end of 1934, she announced the abrogation of j the Washington and London Disarmament Treaties. In 1935, she withdrew from the London Naval Conference. As such, Japan was free to engage on expansion limited only by the country's resources.
Conflicts with the Soviet Union - The common frontier between the Soviet Union and the Japanese possessions in Manchuria and Korea gave every chance for conflicts. By 1935, Russia had more troops in her Far Eastern provinces than Japan had in Manchuria. The Soviet Union had also openly proclaimed that Germany and Japan were her enemies, and in 1936 signed a mutual defense pact with Outer Mongolia.
Among Japan's military leaders, many believed that a clash with Russia was inevitable. For this, every possible preparation was made, in strategy and in stockpiling, in the 1930s.
In mid-1938, Japanese and Soviet troops fought for two weeks along the Russo-Korean border near Changkufeng. The next year, between May and September, more bloody and prolonged hostilities broke out at Nomonhan on the Mongolian-Manchurian border.
Japan's relative lack of success on these occasions made her more wary of the Russian threat on the northern flank. Nonetheless, in April 1941, Japan was able to sign a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union. For Japan, this agreement was designed to free her from uncertainty about her northern frontiers, thereby facilitating her southward thrust into Southeast Asia.
When Germany, Japan's ally, attacked the Soviet Union two months later (June), the Japanese government refused to engage in a simultaneous attack on Russia from the east. In fact, the Russo-German war so preoccupied Russia that the Japanese felt their northern flank in Manchuria was now safe. They had by now decided to proceed southwards even at the risk of war with Britain and the United States.
Alliance with Germany and Italy - The fear of Russia and the consciousness of diplomatic isolation prompted Japan to search for allies. Naturally, she found Germany and Italy, the only two states in the West that were not critical of Japan's aggression on China. Moreover, Japan admired much of Nazi Germany's accomplishments.
Consequently, in December 1936, Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. It provide publicly for cooperation against international communism, and secretly for a defensive alliance against Russia.
In 1938, there were moves for closer Japan-German ties. Berlin proposed a military alliance. The attempt was unsuccessful because Japan's Foreign and Navy Ministers had reservations even though the army was strongly in favour of an alliance. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939 was regarded as an act of betrayal by the Japanese because it was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact and it had freed the Soviet Union to take a stronger stand in the Far East. At that time, Japan was at war with Russia at Nomonhan. There was a sudden revulsion against the Germans. Thus Japan adhered to a "middle-course"- that of non-involvement in the European war.
Yet, German successes in Europe between 1939 and 1940 impressed the Japanese. It led to the conclusion of the Tripartite Axis Pact in September 1940. This provided that the signatories would go to war against any nation attacking one of their members - except those already at war at the time the Pact was signed. As such, the United States was the obvious target.
Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy bound her to the fortunes of these countries. In the eyes of its supporters, the Pact seemed to place an effective check on any strong action by the United States, either in the Pacific or the Atlantic. In fact, it immediately worsened Japanese-American relations.
Advance into Southeast Asia - With the European powers preoccupied with the war with Nazi Germany, their colonies in Asia were left without defense. Japan's militarists thereby formulated plans in 1940 to gain control of Southeast Asia, especially the region's oil, tin, and other strategic raw materials. Such gains would enable the Japanese empire to become self-sufficient economically. The concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere also emerged.
In their calculations, diplomacy was to be tried first, and every effort would be made to avoid a conflict with the United States. But in the last resort force would be used and the risk of war accepted. The first target was French Indo-China. In September 1940, France admitted Japanese troops into northern Indo-China. At the same time, Britain agreed to close the Burma Road for six months as a result of Japan's pressure. Both moves were intended to cut China's southern contact with other countries.
In the meantime, Japan tried to get special economic and political privileges in the Dutch East Indies, but such efforts failed. In July 1941, Japan took a most decisive step. Her forces occupied bases in southern Indo-China. This was a clear threat to the European colonies in Malaya, the East Indies, the Philippines, as well as Siam.
The immediate reaction of the United States, Britain, and Holland was to impose a full-scale economic embargo on Japan. They also hastened their military preparations in Asia and the Pacific. Japan now faced her moment of decision. Her main consideration was the possibility of war with the United States.
War with the United States - In the years between 1931 and Pearl Harbour, American Far Eastern policy espoused the principles of Open Door, China's integrity, and non-aggression, but avoided any idea of trying to support these principles by military action. The result was a mixture of inaction, high moral statements (Stimson's Non-Recognition Doctrine), and free trade theory. On the whole, the American people disapproved Japan's aggression on China, but they favoured a policy of non-involvement. Isolationism was still the hallmark of American sentiment in the 1930s.
In late 1937, Japanese-American relation was strained by the Panay Incident. Japanese naval aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze. This Incident seemed likely to bring the two countries to the brink of war. Yet it was settled by sincere and prompt apologies by Japan, together with an offer of compensation and the recall of the naval air officers concerned. This Incident, followed by the excess at Nanking, did fatal harm to Japanese-American relations.
The insuperable obstacle was Japan's intention to move towards Southeast Asia. The key to a southward advance, as seen by most Japanese leaders, was the reaction of the United States. Only that country had the strength to prevent a Japanese seizure by force of the rich European colonies in Southeast Asia.
Recent signs had not been favourable. First, the United States refused to renew her commercial treaty with Japan in July 1939 as a sign of protest against Japan's aggression on China. Second, the United States applied economic pressure on Japan in 1940. There was an embargo on iron and steel exports to Japan. Finally, a graver blow came in 1941 as a result of Japan's occupation of southern Indo-China. The American government froze all Japanese assets in the United States and imposed a full-scale economic embargo on Japan.
For months, negotiations between Washington and Tokyo reached nowhere. America wanted Japan to withdraw from both Indo-China and China. Japan wanted America to abandon all support of the Chungking government, to recognize Japan's hegemony in East Asia in return for Japanese withdrawal from the Axis Alliance. In the last resort, Japan would evacuate from Indo-China for the uplifting of economic embargo. She was adamant against retreat from China.
When the idea of a Konoe-Roosevelt meeting failed, Japan had to make up her mind. In view of the state of stockpiles and anticipated weather conditions, an Imperial Conference in September 1941 formally agreed to go to war with America and Britain in the coming December should talks in Washington fail to make progress by mid-October.
When the deadline came, Konoe resigned and was succeeded by General Tojo. One last diplomatic effort was tried. In November, a special envoy, Kurusu Saburo, went to Washington. Further negotiations failed because neither side would give way to the extent thought satisfactory by the other. Finally, Japanese fleet set off on November 26, 1941 for the raid on Pearl Harbour on December 7. On the same day, Japan attacked Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines. The Pacific War had begun.
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29. Account for Japan's entry into the Second World War.
Japan's entry into the Second World War could be attributed to both domestic and international factors. In general terms, domestic factors can be regarded as fundamental causes, whereas international factors as immediate causes.
Domestic factors - The primary domestic factor was the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s. In that decade, leaders of political parties in Japan no longer held the ring of national affairs. Increasingly they lost power to militarist leaders in successive political struggles. Since 1932, no party politicians held the post of premiership. In their place were bureaucrats, admirals, and generals. With these people in power, Japan became more and more militarist in nature. When General Tojo became Prime Minister in 1941, Japan had already decided on war with the United States.
The Japanese people at large blindly believed in the slogans of the militarists. For years, they were indoctrinated by various media that the Japanese race was superior and was destined to play a leading role in Asia. They were also taught that loyalty to the emperor and service to the state were the greatest virtues. As such, the Japanese people followed the lead of the militarists who carried them onto a path of aggression and ultimate destruction.
Japan's overseas expansion was justified by Prime Minister Konoe who advocated first the creation of a New Order in East Asia and then a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. These ideas reflected Japan's intention to become the leader of Asian countries and to free them from the yoke of European colonial rule. Behind this was Japan's desire to exploit their resources to make herself and her empire self-sufficient. To fulfill these goals, the Japanese set forth to seize control of these countries, by diplomacy if possible, by war if necessary.
International factors - "War is an extension of politics." (Clausewitz) Arising from a militarist background, Japan embarked on a series of overseas aggression since 1931 which finally led her into war with China, the United States and the western countries by 1941. (for details, see previous questions)
Japan's aggression began with the Manchurian Incident in 1931. In the next few years, Japan became engaged in a full-scale war with China. Japan's military leaders had planned to end the 1937 China War within a few months, but China's stubborn resistance frustrated such plan. True enough, Japan had not fully extended her efforts in the China War, but she did experience an economic strain and a measure of war weariness. In the face of the Chinese strategy of "trading space for time", Japan was drawn deeper and deeper in a prolonged war which imposed a continuous drain of Japanese resources.
In the meantime, Japan's ties with Germany and Italy were strengthened. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Japan adopted a non-involvement policy. Yet, Hitler's speedy victories between 1939 and 1940 moved the Japanese. The outcome was the Tripartite Axis Pact in September 1940. In the eyes of its supporters, the Pact seemed to place an effective check on any strong action by the United States, either in the Pacific or the Atlantic. Should the United States be frightened and remained neutral, Japanese advance into Southeast Asia to make all the European colonies under Japan's control could be facilitated. This was a gross miscalculation. The immediate effect of the Pact was a deterioration of Japanese-American relation.
The most important factor that caused war between Japan and the United States as well as the western nations was Japan's thrust into Southeast Asia between 1940 and 1941. Japan's southward move was a direct challenge to American and European colonies in this region. Their immediate reaction was economic embargo and military preparations. Thus began a vicious cycle. Tightening economic pressure quickened Japan's quest for Southeast Asian resources which in turn intensified economic embargo. Under such circumstances, no diplomatic efforts could solve the impasse. In point of fact, lengthy negotiations between Tokyo and Washington reached nowhere. Each held fast to her own position and failed to give concessions that could satisfy the other. Finally, the war party in Japan decided on war. Then took place the Pearl Harbour incident and Japan's entry into the Second World War.
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30. Explain the defeat of Japan by 1945.
Japan, despite her initial victories in late 1941 and 1942, suffered heavy losses in the course of war. By August 1945, she was forced to surrender unconditionally. Her defeat could be explained by the following factors.
Supremacy of American strength - The main opponent of Japan in the Pacific War was the United States. Soon after Japan's successful raid on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, her offensive was halted by the United States in the Battle of Midway (June 1942). After this engagement, the Allies was able to effect counter-offensives from Hawaii and Australia. By using the tactic of "island hopping", Allied commands were able to overcome Japanese resistance in the Pacific. Together with Allied control of the air, many Japanese strongpoints in the Pacific were cut off from all help or all hope of relief. In the course of military operations, the Allies won a series of important battles at Marianas, Leyte Gulf, Okinawa, and elsewhere. These engagements practically annihilated Japan's air and naval strength.
At the same time, the Allies carried the war to Japan's homeland. The American submarines were successful in destroying Japan's sea communications. As early as the beginning of 1943, they sank ten times as much tonnage as was replaced by new building. Such achievement was "the most decisive single factor in the collapse of Japanese economy."
After the American occupation of the Marianas in mid-1944, American bombers could raid on Tokyo and other regions. The use of incendiary bombs destroyed "forty per cent of the build-up area of more than sixty cities and towns." Devastation was particularly serious in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Kobe. Also by the sinking of ferry boats, communications between the main island with Hokkaido in the north and Kyushu in the west were cut off.
Japan was in fact overwhelmed by American industrial and hence military potentials. As we shall see later, Japan is a have-not country, and she had wished to exploit Southeast Asian resources to carry on the war, but this plan was unsuccessful for various reasons. On the other hand, the United States was economically strong. So great was her industrial strength that the United States was able to equip a war machine that supported war on two fronts - against Germany and Japan at the same time. In the Pacific, the United States quickly rebuilt her shattered fleet, created a strong air force, and replenished military vacancies. In the face of such challenge, Japan was hopeless. Finally, advanced American technology demonstrated itself in the manufacture of atomic bombs. The catastrophe at Hiroshima and Nagasaki only quickened an inevitable Japanese unconditional surrender by August 1945.
Japan's limited resources and exhaustion - When compared with the United States, Japan was only a dwarf in terms of economic resources and manpower. The lack of such important essentials for war doomed Japan to failure.
With her initial victories, Japan overstretched her limits in a vast conquered territory covering New Guinea and Manchuria from south to north, Burma and the central Pacific from east to west. Japan could scarcely provide adequate manpower to safeguard, let alone consolidate, these gains.
As the war progressed, Japan suffered heavy losses in important battles. Together with destruction caused by Allied aerial bombing at home, Japan's resources were so strained that she found it increasingly difficult to continue the war. For instance, Japan's merchant tonnage, in the face of Allied submarine attacks, dropped from some ten million to little more than one million. As for the navy, it has been reduced from some 2.25 million tons to less than 0.2 million. In terms of manpower, there were severe shortages in trained military personnel, especially pilots and field commanders. Sheer heroism and endurance of the rank and file could not bring victory. The resort to the use of suicide planes (Kamikaze) in 1945 was only a reflection of Japan's hopelessness.
At home, by 1945, Japan came close to exhaustion. Transportation was shattered as a result of Allied air attacks and of the lack of maintenance. For the same reasons, production declined rapidly such that even munitions were running short. Consumer goods became unobtainable. Food was scarce, prices rising, black markets everywhere. Education was cut short in order to get more students into the army and the factories. Restrictions on child and women labour were abolished. In sum, the Japanese people were required to work harder, and for less reward, than ever before. The extent of war-weariness was beyond measure. Under such circumstances, Japan's surrender was inevitable.
Stubborn Chinese resistance - A third reason was the stubborn resistance of the Chinese in their war with Japan Sino-Japanese hostilities began early in July 1937. Japan had planned to bring China under control within a few months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, but finally she had to fight for eight years without any hope of success.
Both Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces resorted to guerrilla warfare to drain and eliminate Japan's resources and manpower. As time went on, their strength increased steadily, especially with the Communist forces in the liberated areas. On the other hand, puppet governments of Japanese creation failed to win the support of the Chinese people, even in the occupied areas. This being the case, Japan had to upkeep a significant portion of her land force in China, thereby weakening her commitments elsewhere.
A determined alliance - The resilience of the Chinese, American and British in the war was a great surprise to the Japanese. Despite their initial disasters, the Allied powers persisted in the war against Japan. When the tide began to turn against Japan, the Allies openly announced their policies towards Japan.
In the Cairo Conference, November 1943, America, Britain and China demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan and the restoration of Japan's conquests since 1894 to their former owners. In the Yalta conference, February 1945, Russia promised America and Britain that she would, despite the Russo‑Japanese Neutrality Pact, declare war on Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany. This promise ensured that Japan had to face a major enemy in the north.
Finally, in July 1945, America, Britain, Russia and China jointly announced the Potsdam Declaration which demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan in order to avoid "prompt and utter destruction". They also announced the intention to occupy and demilitarize Japan after her surrender.
A lonely fighter - In contrast to the unity of the Allies, Japan was a lonely fighter throughout the war. When the Second World War broke out, the three parties of the Axis Alliance fought against the Allies in different parts of the world: Japan in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe. Japan got little profit from the alliance with Germany and Italy. The theatre of war in Asia was left to her alone.
As the war progressed and the tide turned against them, Italy was the first to surrender - in September 1943. Then, Germany was invaded at both eastern and western fronts, and she surrendered in May 1945 after the fall of Berlin. With Germany out of the war, Japan had to face the full power of America and Britain. Alone and exhausted, Japan was caught in a hopeless situation. To carry on the struggle seemed meaningless and would surely bring about the extermination of the Japanese race. Emperor Hirohito finally made up his mind and decided on a Japanese surrender.
Failure of the Co-Prosperity Sphere - when the Japanese government declared the creation of a Greater East Asia Go-Prosperity Sphere, it wanted to make it serve Japan's purposes. Politically, Japan would help the Asian countries to overthrow western colonial rule and to set up independent governments under Japan's influence. Economically, Japan would cooperate with these countries to exploit the region's economic resources to carry on the war. In essence, it envisaged "Japan as a liberating force in Asia, as senior partner, rather than dictator, of a group of newly independent nations."
Nonetheless, Japan's behaviour in these countries frustrated its intentions. On the one hand, Japanese officers treated all prisoners-of-war with cruel harshness and defied the terms of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, the hated Kempei, or military police, ruled by terrorism in the occupied areas. Thus the bulk of Asian peoples soon hated the Japanese rule. Movements of resistance took place in countries such as China, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines.
Other factors also contributed to the failure of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Firstly, personnel of the Greater East Asia Ministry at Tokyo lacked efficiency and experience in performing their task. There was a lack of trained technicians capable of restoring the trade and industry of Southeast Asia, especially the production of oil, to their pre-war efficiency. Thus. the plan of creating a powerful and self-sufficient economic bloc to serve Japan's purposes faced great difficulties from the very start.
Secondly, Allied submarine campaign and control of air effectively cut Japan from her more distant and more valuable possessions. It was difficult for Japan's merchant marine to ship back oil, tin, rubber, and other raw materials to its homeland. The result was a disruption of industrial production at home.
In short, Japan failed to make the Co-Prosperity Sphere serve her interests. Her plan of exploiting the region's resources to build up Japan's economic strength so as to enable Japan to meet and contain any counter-attack from outside was unsuccessful. As such, Japan's capabilities in carrying on the war were quite handicapped.
Participation of the Soviet Union in war - On August 8, 1945, two days after the first atomic bomb had destroyed Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. In the opinion of Richard Storry, the Russian participation in war was "a factor as decisive as the atomic bomb" that brought the war to an end. The fear of a Russian invasion of Japan from the north shocked many Japanese and prompted them to accept the formula of "unconditional surrender". This finally took place on August 15, 1945.
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@K.C. Wong, K.K.Yuen, 1982
adapted by TK Chung
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