Japan's reaction to the coming of the West, and specifically to Perry's show of force.

Between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, both Russia and Britain made several unsuccessful attempts to break the sedusion policy of Japan. But the Opium War 1839-42 changed the situation. For instance, Britain came closer to Japan by acquiring Hong Kong and trading ports along Chinese coast. The growth of China trade aroused an interest in Japan and her trade potentials. Merchants, missionaries and officials alike agitated for ending Japan's isolation. At the same time, the Dutch in Deshima had warned the Japanese of the coming of the West and urged them to reconsider the seclusion policy.

In fact, the enforcement of the seclusion policy depended on the willingness of other countries to accept the ban, as well as Japan's ability to resist any foreign demands. In both respects, the position changed gradually to Japan's disadvantages. In particular, the advances in European science, technology and military strength as well as the growth of industrialization brought a mood of expansion among the western powers. Even before the coming of Perry, the Japanese were not unaware of the impending danger. Their attitudes therefore underwent searching test. Three main schools of opinions were presented to cope with the ultimate situation.

Official attitude -- official policy remained unchanged. The bakufu knew of foreign interests on Japan, and this caused it to pay more attention to coastal defences. It did not want to negotiate with the West. As evidenced from its declaration in 1845, it still stuck to the traditional policy of sakoku. On the other hand, it understood the fate that fell on China (defeat in the Opium War) and realized that Japan could not forcefully resist the foreigners and their demands. To sum up, therefore, the bakufu was caught in a dilemna and.was at a loss of what to do.

Mito scholars' attitude -- a second school of opinion was expressed by a number of scholars in the Mito domain. They advocated the "joi" policy in order to keep unity at home by creating a sense of national crisis. They also suggested reforms for self-strengthening. At the same time, they wanted to make use of the rising prestige of the Japanese emperor as a means of healing political divisions. This "sonno" policy could be exploited by the bakufu which headcd the sonno movement. Their ideas could be summed up as "sonno" in the face of diplomatic danger.

Dutch scholars' attitude -- certain Rangakusha (Dutch scholars) questioned the merits of the seculsion policy. From the Dutch, they understood the strength of the West and their interest on Japan. They therefore advocated the opening of Japan to western influence. Sakuma Shozan, for one was convinced that only western weapons could enable Japan to defend herself successfully. He was still wedded to Japanese tradition in non-technical matters. He therefore suggested "Eastern ethics, Western science" as a solution to meet the western challenge.
Sato Shinen, for another, was an advocate of radical economic and political changes, of military reforms and overseas expansion. He recognized that economic and military strength could not be achieved independently of political structure.
These Dutch scholars, in the early 19th century, were regarded as betrayers of Japan's tradition. But with the failure of the joi movement in the early 1860s, their influence increased rapidly.

Actions taken -- on the eve of the coming of the West, the Japanese also took certain actions to prepare themselves for the inevitable. The Mito domain carried out modernization programmes in the 1840s-1850s. It translated Dutch works on military subjects for improving her defences; started iron industries, shipbuilding and casting cannons; as well as implementing financial and administrative reforms. Other domains followed suit. Satsuma improved artillery methods and began to train a western style navy. The bakufu also carried out reforms, especially after the arrival of Perry in 1853. It started naval training school. shipbuilding, and iron foundry. For all these intellectual and material preparations, the coming of Perry and his show of force caused great consternation among the Japanese.

Japanese reaction to Perry:
Official attitude -- Perry's expedition presented the bakufu with a most unpleasant dilemna. On the one hand, serious resistance was scarcely possible given the disparity between the military power of Japan and that of the western nations as well as the probable blockade of the sea routes to Edo. On the other hand, to open the country was almost equally dangerous, at least to the position of the "Barbarian Suppressing General" (Shogun). Furthermore, it would be a violation of the century-old seclusion policy.
It was a sure sign of weakness that the bakufu, after Perry's departure in 1853, should have taken the unprecedented step of seeking the advice of the daimyo as to the answer that should be made to Perry's demands.
Abe Masahiro, then Senior Councillor, suggested a compromise to the American demands. He wrote to the daimyo that "It is requested .. . that you will express your opinions freely ... even though they may be contrary to established policy."
Needless to say, the replies were confused. Officials and daimyo stated opinions in accordance with their own attitudes.

The Mito school -- majority opinion -- most favoured the established policy of seclusion, as represented by the powerful lord of Mito. He told the bakufu that any concessions now would only open the way to further demands. "If we fail to drive them off now," he said, "we shall never have another chance."

The Dutch scholars -- minority opinion -- some advised that the country should be opened, at least for the time being. They wanted to gain time to learn from the West before driving them out later.

Final outcome -- the bakufu was at a loss of what to do, for being torn between conservatism (seclusion) and realism (military inferiority). Under such circumstances, the bakufu tried the policy of peace and procrastination (in order to prepare Japan's defences). In a decree, the bakufu declared: "Our policy shall be to evade any definite answer to their request, while at the same time maintain a peaceful demeanour. It may be, however, that they will have recourse to violence. For that contingency we must be prepared lest the country suffer disgrace. Therefore every effort will be made to prepare means of defence." In the meantime, much effort was spent on coastal defence. But behind this brave show, Abe was willing to accept the American demands. When peace and procrastination failed to appease Perry who came back in 1854 and blockaded Edo, the bakufu, dare not fight, had to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa. (for details, see next part) This Treaty with the United States was but the first because other western nations followed suit. The seclusion policy thus came to an end, and Japan's door was forced ajar a little way.