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Italy, 1815-1914

Stages of unification (Flash movie)

ITALIAN AFFAIRS, 1815-48

1. Political Composition in 1815. After the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, the great powers considered that Italy was not sufficiently strong or self-supporting to stand alone. They made arrangements which perpetuated the division and foreign rule which had existed previously. The only important territorial changes compared to the situation before 1789 was the annexation of the Venetian Republic by Austria and of the former Genoese Republic by Piedmont. Metternich regarded Italy as merely a "geographical expression": Austrian influence in the peninsula was increased to act as a barrier to any new French invasion, and as compensation for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands. The various units in Italy were as follows.

(a) Lombardy and Venetia. Both were placed under direct Austrian rule.

(b) The Kingdom of Naples and Sicily (the Two Sicilies). Austrian arms were responsible for restoring the tyrant Bourbon ruler King Ferdinand. He immediately concluded an offensive and defensive treaty with Austria.

(c) The Papal States.

(d) The duchies of Parma, Modena and Tuscany. Austrian princes or persons friendly to Austria or related to the House of Hapsburg were made rulers.

(c) Piedmont. This included Savoy, Nice, Genoa and the island of Sardinia. This was the only Italian state under Italian rule.

2. Barriers to Italian unity.

No great demand existed among Italians for unity after 1815. They were not encouraged to see Italy as a whole entity, and considerable apathy existed. Some factors accounting for the lack of feeling for unity were as follows.

(a) Tradition of localism and separatism. The "way of life" differed greatly between southern and northern Italy. Feuds and general dissension seemed more characteristic of Italian life than united activity. There was no national flag. Thus the consciousness of a common nationality was little developed. In his Memoirs Metternich wrote: "In Italy provinces are against provinces, towns against towns, families against families, and - men against men.

Examples of the divisions were as follows.

(i) Numerous sovereign states: there had been little co-operation between Italian states in the past. Often local rulers had sacrificed national aspirations for self-interest and had sought foreign aid to help win their domestic quarrels. The states were used to a separate existence and had differing interests, organisation and loyalties.

(ii) Geography: though Italy formed a unity on the map. there were many natural barriers, particularly mountain ranges, and too few roads. This hindered concerted action.

(iii) Administration: there were different customs houses for the various states, and there was no uniformity in the currencies, weights and measures, and other necessary aspects of organisation.

(b) Autocratic rule. Italy was a backward area, especially in the Papal States and the Two Sicilies. After 1815 there was a universal reaction among the rulers against all the ideas of the French Revolution. No state had a parliament, and there was no semblance of popular participation in government. Restored princes abolished all constitutions and many laws and institutions of French origin. Vaccination and gas illumination were forbidden for the simple reason that the French had introduced them.

Local rulers, with the exception of those of Piedmont, opposed any plans for unity since they were likely to result in the loss of their powers and privileges. Even in Piedmont the aristocracy continued to exercise feudal rights over the peasantry.

(c) Different schools of thought. Italy represented several myths based on past traditions. Italians were aware that Italy represented to some the glories of the Roman Republic or Empire, to others the medieval free city-states or the power of the Pope. In the period 1815-48 there were three main schools of thought on how to achieve unity, but all three groups disliked each other and had no wish to co-operate.

(i) Democratic republicans: Mazzini wanted to abolish monarchies and to establish a democratic republic..

(ii) Papal federalists: the idea that the Papacy was the best instrument for uniting Italy and modernising her political institutions had had support in Italy since the Middle Ages. It was known as the Neo-Guelf movement and received renewed impetus when Vincenzo Gioberti suggested in his Primato (1843) that Italy should be a federal state under a reformed Papacy.

(iii) Liberal monarchists: there were hopes among intellectuals and businessmen in Piedmont that Charles Albert would liberalise the institutions and lead Italy to unity. Piedmont had the best chance of defeating foreign powers, if only her monarch, from the House of Savoy, would take the lead.

The sentiments of this school were expressed in Balbo's pamphlet On the Hopes of Italy (1844) and the writings of d'Azeglio.

(d) The Roman Question. The Pope had temporal power over central Italy. He was supported not only by loyal Catholics in Italy but by France and Austria. He opposed any movement in Italy likely to threaten his authority in the Papal States, and his territory constituted a wedge between the northern and southern parts of Italy.

(e) Presence of Austria. Austria was an important conservative Catholic power. This state had considerable influence in Italy after 1815, except in Piedmont, and was the chief barrier to the aspirations of Italian nationalists.

3. Early Italian revolts. Numerous revolts occurred during 1820-1, but the tradition of separatism prevented any co-ordination between them. For example, the rising in Naples collapsed before the one in Piedmont started.

After 1820 the King of Piedmont tried to arrange some concerted organisation among Piedmont, Bavaria, Naples and the Papal States to oppose Austria. This failed owing to the opposition of the last two states.

The revolts in the following states were easily suppressed by Austrian forces.

(a) Naples. In July 1820 General Pepe marched on the capital and extracted a democratic constitution from the King. This was based on the Spanish constitution of 1812. Eventually the King was able to gain the support of Austria. Her army, with the moral support of Prussia and Russia at the Troppau meeting, intervened in Naples and punished the rebels. The constitution was abolished. Austrian troops remained garrisoned there until 1828 to defend the King in case his subjects tried to force him to grant a constitution again.

(b) Piedmont. In March 1821 a mutiny occurred in the Piedmontese army, with demands for a constitution. Victor Emmanuel abdicated in favour of his brother Charles Felix The young Charles Albert, known for his liberal sympathies, became regent. Felix appealed to Austria, and Austrian troops put down the rising at Novara.

(c) Papal States. At the end of 1830 disorders spread throughout central Italy in a chain reaction from Modena to Parma and from there to the Papal States. Provisional governments were formed and new charters granted. In 1831 rebels in the Papal States demanded lay government, but Pope Gregory XWI was not prepared to remove priests from political, administrative and judicial posts. He appealed to Austria, and the rebellion was crushed. The rebels had expected aid from France, but Louis Philippe was not willing to help.

Austrian forces were withdrawn in July 1831 but had to be recalled to Bologna in January 1832. This provoked the French into sending a force to occupy Ancona.

4. Factors promoting unity. Despite the causes of disunity, Italy constituted an entity from the racial, linguistic and cultural standpoints. Factors making for eventual political unity were as follows.

(a) Growth of national feeling,. Among the intelligentsia and the progressive middle classes there was a growing interest in the prospects of unity after 1815. It was partly inspired by the following.

(i) An increased hatred of Austria, whose presence in the north served as a perpetual reminder of the humiliating situation of Italy.

(ii) The memories of the efficiency of French administration and the liberalism of French legal codes. This made Italians dissatisfied with the feudal and reactionary practices restored after 1815.

(b) Economic progress.

(i) Free trade: internal customs barriers hindered trade both within and among Italian states. Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835) was one of the school of economists who saw the abolition of customs frontiers in Italy and the adoption Of freer trade as a step to unity.

(ii) Communications: D'Azeglio remarked that railways, which started with the Lombardo-Venetian line in 1835, would provide stitching for the Italian boot.

(iii) Agriculture: numerous societies not only helped the application of modern science to land but also increased the sense of Italian solidarity. Charles Albert, King of Piedmont after 1831, became president of the Piedmontese agricultural association. It drew members from various north Italian states, who in time expressed a desire for greater unity.

(c) Cultural and literary works. Certain men of letters helped to inspire the people to resist the tyranny of foreign rule. Notable contributors were the following.

(i) Vittorio Alfieri (1749-1803), who in his plays created an image of Italy as a place of tragic drama and a passion for liberty.

(ii) Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) whose literature and poetry on Greece and Rome helped to stir the consciousness of people about Italy's mighty classical past.

(iii) Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873), who in his historical novel I Promessi Sposi (1825) encouraged Italians to adopt an optimistic outlook regarding their future.

(d) Activities of secret societies. The most significant forms of resistance after 1815 were the numerous conspiratorial societies. Their membership was made up partly of the disgruntled elements of society and partly of adventurous youth looking for an exciting and glamorous life. The societies were important in giving Italians training in how to fight for their rights.

Two of the societies were the following.

(i) The Carbonari: this was the so-called Society of Charcoal-burners which originated in Naples. At first it was an association for mutual assistance among officers of lower rank. After 1811 its activities became increasingly political. It aimed to expel the Austrians from Italy and played an active part in the revolutions of 1820-1 and 1831.

(ii) The Federati: this was an aristocratic society in Piedmont. It supported the 1821 rebellion.

(e) Inspiration of Mazzini.

5. Work of Mazzini. Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72), the son of a Genoese doctor, was the soul of Italian unification.

(a) His ideas. Apart from being a patriot, he was a gifted orator and idealistic writer. He believed that a nation had a moral purpose and that unity, achieved through war, would be a stage towards a free confederation of all Europe influenced by a spirit of Christian brotherhood. He was described by Metternich as the most dangerous man in Europe.

(b) His activities. In 1827 he joined the Carbonari. In 1830 he was arrested, imprisoned and then exiled. Charles Albert, who became King of Sardinia in 1831, ignored Mazzini's appeal to assume the leadership of the movement for Italian freedom.

The succession of Italian failures in 1820-1 and 1830 convinced Mazzini of the need to appeal to a wider audience than that reached by the secret societies. He started to publicise the problems of Italy abroad and to impress on people the need for co-ordinated action.

(i) In 1831 he formed at Marseilles the society of "Young Italy". It was designed to be a national rather than a regional movement and soon had a large membership throughout Italy. In 1832 he was exiled from France and in 1833 organised an unsuccessful invasion of Savoy from Switzerland.

(ii) In 1834, working from England, he founded the society "Young Europe".

(c) His contribution. He dissipated much of his time in encouraging ill-prepared risings. Examples were the revolt in Cosenza in 1843 and the fruitless Calabrian expedition of two Venetian sailors in 1844.

However, he was invaluable in encouraging many Italians in the cause of unity and in showing them a way to achieve it. He was the first Italian to promote nationalism and to work actively towards a united Italy through political action. He popularised ideas for:

(i) the overthrow of native and foreign tyrants in Italy;

(ii) the unification of Italy on republican and democratic lines;

(iii) the need for Italians to achieve their goal through good organisation and their own united efforts.

6. Reforms of the new Pope. In June 1846 Giovanni Mastai Ferretti (1792-1878) was elected Pope Pius IX. He began with the reputation of being a liberal. He was interested in Gioberti's idea of a confederation of states under his leadership, and his love of Italy, dislike of Austrian domination and moderate political concessions made many liberals see him as a possible leader of Italy. However, there was nothing radical about any of his acts. He firmly believed that representative government and Papal authority were incompatible.

In the first few months of Pius's reign the following developments occurred.

(a) An amnesty was given to exiles and political prisoners, limited freedom of speech was granted and the press censorship was modified.

(b) In June 1847 the Pope agreed to the appointment of a Council of Ministers to help in the governing of the Papal States.

(c) In August 1847 the Pope made the suggestion that a customs union should be formed. Piedmont rejected this, fearing competition for Italian leadership from the Papacy. In the same month Austria sent troops to Ferrara in Romagna in protest against the direction of Papal policy.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848-9

7. Outbreak of revolution. In 1848 a series of events led to either the expulsion of Austrian troops or the granting of political concessions in the following states.

(a) Lombardy. In January the citizens of Milan abandoned smoking to annoy the Austrians, who monopolised the tobacco trade. A series of incidents, the "tobacco riots", resulted in Austrian troops using force, and several people died. Later, on 18th March, a desperate five-day battle resulted in the expulsion of the Austrian troops.

(b) Sicily. On 12th January rebels in Palermo defeated Ferdinand ll's troops. The King was forced to accept the 1812 constitution and to extend it to Naples and grant an amnesty to political prisoners.

(c) Tuscany. On 11th February the Grand Duke agreed to allow representative government and the grant of a constitution.

(d) Piedmont. On 4th March Charles Albert, anxious to have the support of the liberals for any war with Austria, granted a constitution.

(c) The Papal States. On 15th March the Pope reluctantly accepted a new constitution.

(f) Venetia. On 22nd March Venice rose and expelled Austrian troops. Under Manin an independent republic was proclaimed.

8. Start of Austro-Piedmontese war. Originally Charles Albert contemplated allying with Austria to gain territory from the French. He was reluctant to attack Austria, a Catholic power. However, when Austria occupied Ferrara in 1847 despite the Pope's protests, this gave him an opportunity to pose as the defender of the Church.

Charles Albert became interested in the possibilities of taking Lombardy from Austria. He was influenced by the aristocratic liberals, led by Balbo and Cavour, who wanted to unite the northern states in one economic unit. On 23rd March he issued a proclamation declaring that his people sympathised with the heroic struggles of Lombardy and Venice. His troops then attacked Austrian forces in Lombardy.

9. The Pope and the war. When the war in Lombardy began, Papal troops were dispatched to the north, presumably to cooperate with the Piedmontese army. However, on 29th April the Pope announced that he opposed offensive war against Austria and refused to permit his troops to fight against fellow Catholics. Therefore, in his desire for peace and legitimacy, the Pope had abandoned the national cause.

The results of the Pope's actions were as follows.

(a) The Pope lost the opportunity to pose as Italian leader. Liberals lost faith in the Pope as a potential political leader. Thus Gioberti's solution had little chance of being accepted. People were now keener to turn to Piedmont for a leader in establishing unity.

(b) The Italian revolt was seriously weakened.

(i) Popular enthusiasm for the national cause weakened, since the Pope no longer gave it his moral support.

(ii) King Ferdinand was able to use the opportunity to recall General Pepe's army of Neapolitans which had set off for the north. It was to be used to re-conquer Sicily and to re-establish his autocratic rule once again.

(iii) Papal troops were withdrawn. Thus Charles Albert received little military support outside Piedmont.

10. The revolt weakened by disunity. Mutual suspicions and jealousies prevented effective co-ordination between the Italian states. Local feelings were strong, and Charles Albert was not popular in the rest of Italy.

Outside Piedmont there was little organisation to the revolts, and there was a diversity of aims. Numerous groups, royalists, republicans and autonomists, pursued different objectives, which made concerted action difficult.

(a) Lombardy and Venetia. Friction existed between Venice and Milan. When the two states had asserted their independence from Austria they were reluctant at first to surrender it to a new North Italian kingdom based on Turin in Piedmont.

There were further complications. In Milan the upper bourgeoisie supported Charles Albert, while the lower bourgeoisie under Cattaneo were republican-minded and wanted autonomy within a federation. It was not until the beginning of July that they agreed on union with Piedmont. By then the fortunes of war were turning against the Italians.

(b) Southern Italy. Before they were actually withdrawn from the north, the Neapolitan and Papal troops had been instructed not to cross the Po into Austrian territory. In the south there was rivalry between Messina and Palermo. Class rivalry also undermined the struggle. The aristocratic liberals were not prepared to implement agrarian reforms which the farmers wanted.

Disorders occurred in Naples owing to the liberal government's lack of experience. Ferdinand took advantage of this to dismiss the short-lived parliament and recover complete power. Sicily, which had declared its independence, was then forced by an intensive bombardment to surrender in May 1849.

(c) Tuscany. Leopold, the Grand Duke, approved of the idea of calling an Italian Constituent Assembly for settling the conditions of union among the states. The scheme failed owing to the opposition of Piedmont and the Pope. Leopold thereupon abandoned the national cause.

11. Defeat of Piedmont. Despite the lack of support from other Italian states, it seemed at first that Piedmont might succeed against Austria, who had serious domestic troubles at home.

Unfortunately Piedmont had no great statesman capable of welding the various groups who were hostile to Austria into one united body. Charles Albert was courageous and determined, but possessed little military skill and had no distinguished generals on whom he could rely. Initially his forces were successful, capturing the fortress of Peschiera and winning the battle of Goito. However, he failed to pursue his advantage, which gave the Austrians time to consolidate their position and to gain reinforcements.

Austria defeated Piedmont decisively on the following two occasions.

(a) Custozza (25th July 1848). While attacking one wing of the Quadrilateral, Piedmontese forces were defeated by a counter-attack of Radetzky's forces. In August Piedmont withdrew from the struggle.

(b) Novara (23rd March 1849). Following a renewed outbreak of violence in Vienna in March 1849, Charles Albert again marched his troops into Lombardy. The King was heartbroken when his troops were defeated again and abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel II.

Piedmont suffered no territorial loss since Austria was anxious not to annoy Britain or France. She had to pay an indemnity of 75 million lire, but the new king refused to abrogate the constitution as the Austrians demanded.

12. Events in Rome. For a time there was hope that something fruitful could still come from the Papacy. In September the Pope appointed as Prime Minister a liberal, Count Rossi, who explored the possibilities of Gioberti's scheme of federation. On 15th November 1848 he was murdered by some Lombard volunteers. Events then took the following course.

(a) Flight of the Pope. Pius IX fled to Naples on 24th November, disguised as a simple priest.

(b) Declaration of a republic. A provisional government administered the city until a Constituent Assembly could be elected. In February 1849 this latter body proclaimed Rome a republic.

Mazzini became the head of government and carried out a series of reforms. However, his doctrines were little understood and his appeals to duty and self-sacrifice did not attract the support of the labourers and peasants.

(c) Papal authority restored. The Pope appealed to European powers to help him, and the governments of Spain, Naples and Austria indicated their intentions of rendering aid. However, France intervened first, the new leader Louis Napoleon seeing an opportunity to win glory.

(i) In March 1849 the Constituent Assembly voted funds for a military expedition. Its object was to mediate between the Pope and his rebellious subjects.

(ii) A French army under General Oudinot landed in April but was repulsed at first by Garibaldi when it advanced on Rome.

(111) Oudinot waited for reinforcements and then on authority from Napoleon began a full-scale military operation. The Neapolitans gave some assistance and Rome surrendered to the French on 30th June.

13. Reasons for the failure of the uprisings. The various contributing factors were as follows.

(a) Austrian military power. The Austrians held the famous "Quadrilateral" of Verona, Peschiera, Legnago and Mantua, all places of great strength. This gave their army a link with Austria so that they could receive reinforcements. The discipline of their troops and the military skill of their commander, Radetzky, could not be equalled by the Piedmontese.

The Venetians were the last to surrender. However, long-range artillery bombardment, cholera and starvation eventually forced Manin in Venice to admit defeat on 24th August 1849.

(b) Lack of external aid. Charles Albert was determined to fight Austria without foreign support, believing in the maxim "Italia fara da se". The Lombards had been anxious to enlist the help of the French, but France was discouraged by Britain from playing any active part in the rebellion.

(c) Lack of unity and organisation (see 10).

(d) Lack of outstanding statesmen or generals (see 11).

(e) Opposition of the Pope (see 9).

(f) Intervention of the French in Rome (see 12(c)).

CAVOUR AND PIEDMONT

14. Factors aiding Italian unification after 1848. After the setbacks received during 1848-9, the following factors contributed to the creation of the Italian nation during the period 1849-71.

(a) Diplomatic skill of Cavour.

(b) Fighting qualities of Garibaldi (see below). Early in life Garibaldi was a faithful follower of Mazzini and joined the "Young Italy" movement. He entered the Piedmontese navy to induce it to mutiny in favour of Mazzini's plot of 1833. He escaped, was condemned to death in his absence and disappeared to South America. He played an important role from 1848 onwards, for example, as regards the following.

(i) In the troubled times of 1848 he fought for the Lombards against the Austrians and in 1849 defended Rome in vain against the French.

(ii) Cavour was able to gain his support for Italian unity built around Piedmont and its monarchy.

(iii) He had the capacity to instil confidence into people and to draw followers for his cause, whatever it was. It was his influence in Sicily and Naples during 1860 which was decisive in whining converts to Italian unity (see 34-36).

(c) Agitative activities of Mazzini. It must be noted that Mazzini became increasingly an embarrassment to the cause of Italian unity after 1848. His occupation and defence of Rome in 1848-9 proved to be abortive. He disapproved of Piedmont's participation in the Crimean War and her use of France as an ally in 1859. He believed that Italians should achieve unity through their own efforts and that a democratic republic should be the aim. This conflicted with the aims of Piedmont. After another Mazzini-sponsored rising had failed in 1857 many of his followers deserted him.

Mazzini disliked the diplomatic methods used by Cavour to secure the south in 1860-1. However, his continued efforts kept alive the spark of resistance in Italy, as outlined in 5(c) above.

(d) Use of foreign aid.

(i) France helped gain Lombardy in 1859 and Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Romagna for the new Italian state in 1860.

(ii) Britain lent moral support (see 38(a)).

(iii) Prussia helped gain Venetia in 1866 (see 41).

(e) Leadership of the Piedmontese state (see 15).

15. Piedmontese leadership. After 1848 Piedmont was recognised as the hope of liberal Italy, for the following reasons.

(a) It alone possessed an army capable of fighting Austria.

(b) It had a constitution and a liberal government.

(c) In contrast to the other states it alone had taken the lead in 1848 in the cause of national unity.

(d) In Victor Emmanuel II it possessed a ruler determined to continue the struggle against Austria.

(c) It provided a base for the fostering of political groups. An important one later proved to be the National Society (see 23).

(f) The ideas of Gioberti, Mazzini and republicans in general no longer seemed feasible.

16. Rise to power of Cavour. Camillo di Cavour (1810-61), a Piedmontese aristocrat, had travelled widely and had studied the political life in Britain and France. In 1847 he founded the liberal newspaper II Risorgimento. In 1848 he was elected to the first Piedmontese Parliament. He played an important role in planning and retaining the statuto (constitution) of 1848 with its bicameral legislature and responsible cabinet. In 1850 he became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and in 1852 he succeeded Massimo d'AzegIio as Prime Minister.

17. Cavour's domestic measures. Cavour aimed to make Piedmont economically progressive, politically liberal and financially stable. In this way he hoped that Piedmont would be strong enough to assume the leadership of Italy in the event of another war with Austria.

Examples of areas in which Cavour's measuies were effective were the following.

(a) Administration. He encouraged reforms in the army, state administration and legal systems.

(b) Trade and industry. He pioneered scientific agriculture, negotiated trade treaties and introduced new industries. He encouraged overseas investors and advisers to help in the economic development of Piedmont.

(c) Religion.

(i) In 1850 he drafted the Siccardi Laws which curbed the powers of the Church by abolishing ecclesiastical courts.

(U) In 1855 religious orders were abolished, except those concerned with teaching, preaching and helping the sick.

(d) Communications. He worked to make Piedmont part of an international network. Schemes were initiated for the piercing of Mont Cenis by a rail tunnel and for turning Genoa into a great commercial port.

18. French aid sought. The Italian failures of 1848-9 convinced Cavour that Italy could not achieve unity without foreign help. Britain was sympathetic to the Italian cause, but was not likely to render material assistance. Her diplomats believed that Austrian power in Central Europe was necessary to preserve the balance of power between France and Russia.

Cavour wanted to prevent any chance of Austria consolidating her power in Italian affairs. Napoleon 1II, the champion of nationality, seemed a likely ally to help Piedmont overturn the status quo.

19. Reasons for Napoleon's interest. For different reasons Napoleon was interested in the affairs of northern, central and southern Italy.

(a) Northern Italy. Napoleon's family origins had been Italian and he was a former member of the Carbonari. He wanted to help Piedmont free Italy from Austrian rule, but his motives, were far from altruistic. French nationalists did not want a strong power rising on their south-east border. Napoleon hoped that French influence would replace that of Austria in northern Italy, and also that France's Alpine frontier might be restored by the acquisition of Nice and Savoy.

(b) Central and southern Italy. Napoleon had no wish to unite Italy as many liberals hoped. He wanted to keep Italy weak and divided, and, except as far as the north was concerned, was a supporter of the status quo.

(i) Napoleon relied on the support of the clericals at home. He therefore supported the Pope's position in central Italy even though this presented an obstacle to Italian unity after 1848.

(ii) King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was supported by the Tsar, with whom Napoleon wanted to remain on good terms. Napoleon therefore opposed any action likely to harm the position of the Bourbon monarch.

20. Piedmont in the Crimean War. Cavour hoped European powers might be interested in Italian problems if Piedmont played an active role abroad. In December 1855 France and Britain invited Piedmont to join them in the Crimean War. The Piedmontese cabinet opposed the idea, but Cavour eventually brought Piedmont into the war.

In 1856 a Piedmontese force under La Marmora did well at the battle of the Tchernaya. This helped to extinguish the stigma of earlier defeats at the hands of Austria, and Piedmont staked a claim to Italian leadership.

At the Paris peace conference Italian affairs were debated and Napoleon continued to express interest. However, Cavour was unable to gain French support for any changes in Italy.

FRENCH AID AND THE AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1859

21. The Orsini incident. Cavour despaired of help from France. Napoleon appeared to have forgotten about the Italian cause. However, it was soon brought to his attention in a forcible manner. In January 1858 Felice Orsini, an Italian patriot, tried to assassinate the Emperor in front of the Paris Opera House.

Orsini, together with his accomplices, was arrested. He later appealed to the Emperor to assist Italian liberty, charging him with being a traitor to the cause of Italian freedom. This appeal was read out at his trial. Napoleon was sufficiently impressed to have it published and sent a copy to Cavour.

France protested strongly to Britain, where the bombs used had been manufactured, and to Piedmont. Victor Emmanuel gave a firm reply, while Cavour took measures against the Mazzini press. This mollified the anger of Napoleon, who then decided to assist Cavour in earnest.

22. Franco-Italian negotiations. The following steps were- taken to form closer liaison between Piedmont and France.

(a) Plombières meeting. Napoleon invited Cavour to a meeting on 20th July 1858. He suggested that a northern Italian state under Victor Emmanuel and a central Italian federation under the presidency of the Pope should be formed.

Cavour was cautious and nothing definite was signed. The meeting was novel in that it was a deliberate attempt to manufacture a war.

(i) Napoleon agreed to help Piedmont if she were involved in war with Austria.

(ii) Nice and Savoy were to be ceded to France in return for her assistance.

(b) Marriage arrangement. It had been agreed at Plombieres, that a marriage would first be arranged between the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, the fifteen-year-old Princess Clotilde, and Jerome, a cousin of Napoleon III. This took place in September 1858 and cleared the way for tightening the arrangements between the two countries.

(c) Military alliance. France and Piedmont signed a formal military alliance in January 1859. This time no mention was made of a federation or of any specific state boundaries. Napoleon hoped these would be based on his Plombieres proposals. The details were as follows.

(i) France would defend Piedmont from attack if Cavour was able to engineer hostilities so that Austria appeared the aggressor.

(ii) France would supply 200,000 troops and Piedmont 100,000.

(iii) A northern kingdom would be created, and Papal sovereignty maintained. Piedmont would gain Lombardy and Venetia in the event of the Austrian defeat.

23. Formation of the National Society. In 1857 Mazzini, working from England, organised insurrections in Genoa and Livorno. They failed and a similar fate befell a landing at Sapri on the Calabrian coast. Many Italian nationalists then realised the futility of isolated risings. A new organisation, the National Society, was formed which united many of the groups of the early risorgimento. Its leaders were Pallavicino, La Farina, Garibaldi and Daniele Manin. They believed that Cavour would be a valuable ally to co-ordinate the activities of the Italian national movement. The motto of the society became '1ndependence, unity and constitutional liberty under the Savoy dynasty."

24. Austria provoked by Cavour. In 1857 the liberal Archduke Maximilian had been made viceroy in Lombardy and had tried to enforce a conciliatory Austrian policy. However, relations with Piedmont had been poor. In February Cavour had broken off diplomatic relations with Vienna over the expulsion of a Sardinian senator from Lombardy.

After the Plomb&res meeting in mid 1858 Cavour planned to bring about war with Austria. He tried to avoid placing Piedmont and France too clearly in the wrong.

Austria disliked the following.

(a) Piedmont's refusal to extradite draft evaders. At the end of 1858 Austria imposed military conscription in Lombardy and Venetia. To evade the draft, many fled to Piedmont, and when Austria demanded their return this was refused.

(b) Cavour's negotiations with the National Society. Cavour saw the value of encouraging the conspiratorial activities of the secret societies, which many Italians supported. These societies advertised the problems of Italy abroad and contributed to the raising of the political temperature at home.

Publicly Cavour disowned any activities which would be viewed with alarm in London and Paris. Privately he opened

negotiations with the National Society. He informed La Farina in October 1858 of his aims to bring about risings in the northern and central states. The Society played a valuable part in preparing the public mood for war. Garibaldi was asked to form a volunteer force, and many of the recruits for this were Lombards. The Society prepared arms depots and circulated pamphlets supporting Piedmontese leadership.

(c) A provocative speech by Victor Emmanuel. In January 1859, on a suggestion of Napoleon, the King spoke of the "cries of grief" that were reaching Piedmont from the rest of Italy.

(d) Piedmont's efforts to raise war loans. Austrian war preparations gave Cavour an excuse to take similar action. La Marmora, the Finance Minister, was told to raise the necessary loans for a war in February 1859.

25. Intervention of other European powers. Both Piedmont and Austria started to mobilise their forces. Cavour aimed at a defensive mobilisation to force Austria to issue an ultimatum.

In February 1859 Britain sent a mission to Vienna to urge demobilisation. However, in March a secret Franco-Russian Treaty provided for Russian neutrality in the event of a Franco-Austrian war and for Russian troop movements to threaten Austria in the cast, on condition that France supported Russia's policy of revising the Black Sea clauses.

Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, proposed a congress to solve the question. This was accepted by Britain and Napoleon, but Austria demanded Piedmont's exclusion from the congress and demanded the disarmament of Piedmont before the congress met. Napoleon, pressured by the other European states, and disheartened by the lack of enthusiasm at home, forced Cavour to agree to the Austrian demand on 19th April.

26. The Austrian ultimatum. Because of the wish to protect her security, Austria had made the initial mistake of mobilising her large army too soon. To keep the Austrian army mobilised indefinitely was an expensive procedure if peace negotiations were prolonged. Buol, the Austrian Chief Minister, was impatient of delay. He ignored the warning of his more cautious colleagues to avoid precipitate action until the French position had been clarified. This was sound advice, for there was the possibility that the Franco-Piedmontese alliance would collapse, given time for diplomatic pressure to be exerted on the wavering Napoleon.

Piedmont was on the point of disarming when Buol, on 19th April, sent a fatal ultimatum giving Cavour the alternative between unconditional demobilisation "within three days" or war. This was a blunder as it supplied Cavour with the provocation he needed. Piedmont refused, and Austria declared war, thereby appearing the aggressor.

27. Defeat of Austria. The military weakness of Austria was soon revealed. Important factors contributing to her defeat were as follows.

(a) Poor commanders. The Emperor Francis Joseph took personal charge of the army. He relied for advice on the courtier-soldier Count Grunne, who had no combat experience. The incompetent Gyulai was appointed to the Italian command. Inadequate use was made of the abilities of Benedek or the strategist Hess.

(b) Poor strategy. Austria delayed invading Piedmont in force until 29th April. This gave Napoleon time to move troops into Italy, making maximum use of the recently completed railway system. The Austrians were confident of victory, and neglected to organise an adequate supply system (there was no railway between Trieste and Venice) and to acquire accurate knowledge of enemy strength and capabilities.

(c) Insufficient forces. Austria was not able to utilise all her available forces. It was necessary to retain German and Czech troops in Hungary to prevent a possible rising there. Troops were also kept in reserve in case France attacked through South Germany. Austria thus sent only 90,000 men to Italy.

(d) Poor morale. The loyalty of many to the Austrian cause was slender. The different national elements of the army had no interest in the issue of the campaign. Italians, Hungarians and even the trusted Croats deserted in large numbers.

Gyulai's lack of decisiveness allowed the French and Italian forces to combine. After preliminary skirmishes, two bloody battles were fought at Magenta (4th June) and Solferino (24th June). Losses were heavy on both sides but they were narrow victories for the French and Italians, who then conquered the whole of Lombardy. The Austrians retreated into the Quadrilateral (see 13).

28. Reasons for the end of the war. The war might have been prolonged as the Austrian defeats had not been decisive. However, the chief contestants were by then anxious for peace. Napoleon was shocked by the terrible toll which the war had taken of human life and the lack of adequate medical facilities for the wounded. He decided, without consulting Cavour, to negotiate directly with Francis Joseph for a peace settlement. He found the Emperor as eager to abandon the war as he had been previously to enter into it. The following factors contributed to the premature peace.

(a) Prussian mobilisation and offer of mediation. Britain a stated that she would remain neutral if the war was confined to Italy. It was hinted that Prussia should adopt the same approach but that Britain would not object if Prussia mobilised on the Rhine.

Prussia offered to mediate and backed up the offer with the mobilisation of six army corps in the Rhineland on 24th June. This did not please the French or the Austrians.

(i) Napoleon felt that a prolonged war would tempt Prussia to cause trouble.

(ii) The Prussian mobilisation indirectly threatened Austria. The war had revealed the weak state of the Austrian army. If more reinforcements were sent to Lombardy, this would have made Austria utterly dependent on the Prussian army to defend Germany. Thus Austria wanted to avoid Prussian involvement in the war, which would have meant the granting of political concessions to Prussia in German affairs.

(b) Unstable conditions in Austrian Empire. Owing to an economic slump Austria had difficulty in raising loans to finance the war. Civil war threatened in Hungary and troops had to be stationed there to keep order and to collect the taxes, which the government officials had been unable to do. The Hungarian leader Kossuth visited Napoleon's headquarters, and Austria feared the possibility of open revolt breaking out in Hungary.

(c) Developments in Italy. The tremendous upsurge of popular enthusiasm for the national cause which had followed the battles surprised both the French and the Austrians. Austria disliked the prospect of losing all influence in Italy, and Napoleon feared that France would lose all opportunity of exerting influence herself. Instead of a weak, loose federation being formed in the north the nucleus of a strong, unified state was appearing, as shown by the following developments.

(i) The duchies: the hereditary rulers of Tuscany, Parma and Modena fled to the Austrian camp after Magenta. National risings took place in Tuscany and Parma. Cavour sent agents to organise pro-Piedmontese governments, and he had plans for incorporating Tuscany, which Napoleon had envisaged would form part of a central Italian federation under the Pope.

(H) The Papal States: the withdrawal of the Austrian garrison from Bologna (Romagna) paved the way for risings in the Papal States and the spread of the influence of Piedmont to the south. The French clericals had vehemently opposed the war in the first place. If the war continued it seemed likely that the Italians might try to capture Rome. Napoleon wanted to avoid any unnecessary complications which would be involved in sending troops to aid the Pope.

29. The Peace of Villafranca. Preliminary peace terms were settled by Napoleon and Francis Joseph on l lth July at Villafranca near Verona. Cavour was not consulted.

(a) Peace conditions. These were as follows.

(i) Lombardy, except for the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, was to be transferred to Piedmont. Napoleon was to be the intermediary in this arrangement. Parma was tacitly conceded as well.

(ii) All Italy was to be included in a new confederation. This was to be under the titular presidency of the Pope.

(iii) The hereditary rulers of Tuscany and Modena were to be restored.

(iv) Austria was to retain Venetia. This state was to form part of the new confederation.

(b) Short-term results. Provisions listed as (a)(iii) and (iv) above seemed to negate the purposes of the war, for the following reasons.

(i) Austria was still in a dominant position in Italy. She was still militarily strong, controlling the Quadrilateral without having to defend the awkward Plain of Lombardy.

(ii) France had achieved nothing. She had incurred considerable military expense and her troops had suffered heavy losses, but she received no thanks for her help and made no territorial gains. The war had provoked much hostile criticism at home, and Piedmont considered Napoleon a traitor to the Italian cause for abruptly terminating hostilities.

(iii) Piedmont had gained only Lombardy. Cavour resigned in disgust.

 30. Failure of the settlement. Events in Italy took a surprising turn which was to help the Italian cause. The Villafranca terms were unenforceable, for the following reasons.

(a) The duchies refused to accept the return of their rulers. After successful revolutions the duchies were not prepared to accept the restoration of their rulers. The royal commissioners (agents of Cavour) refused to stand down. They were helped by the National Society.

(i) Modena, Parma and Romagna were united under the name of Emilia by La Farina. The government was then organised to petition for annexation by Piedmont.

(ii) Tuscany wanted to unite with Piedmont, but initially distrusted her. However, Baron Ricasoli triumphed in per

suading the Assembly to vote for union.

(b) The Pope refused to co-operate. He was not keen to see the formation of any confederation, fearing the loss of his temporal power. A pamphlet had been issued in France with the approval of Napoleon which suggested that the Papal territories should be reduced to a minimum.

(c) Napoleon refused to allow force to be used to implement Villafranca. In August the representatives of France, Austria and Piedmont met at Zurich. Napoleon opposed the idea of an enlarged Piedmontese union. He also rejected the use of force. This meant that Austria was unable to restore the rulers in the duchies, since this would have been impossible without the use of force.

(d) Britain gave moral support to Italy. In the 1859 elections a strong Liberal government came to power in Britain under the leadership of Palmerston and Russell, who favoured the creation of a unitary Italian state. In January 1860 they urged France and Austria to abstain from intervention in Italian affairs.

Russell suggested to Napoleon four points which would allow the duchies to vote on the question of annexation to Piedmont through elected assemblies.

31. Agreement between Cavour and Napoleon. Piedmont was as powerless as Austria to act without the consent of the powers. However, events were by then favourable to the Italian cause and Cavour returned to office in January 1860. He resolved to break the deadlock and bluntly asked Napoleon for his price for annexation. Napoleon 111 was only prepared for Piedmont to annex Tuscany and Emilia if France was compensated for the creation of a powerful state on her south-eastern flank. Cavour agreed to cede Savoy and Nice.

It was agreed in the Treaty of Turin of 24th March that plebiscites would be held in all the areas concerned. Austria was prepared to acquiesce in these arrangements, and Cavour was ready to abandon his belief in elected assemblies in favour of this rather false method of testing popular approval. The plebiscites were carried out in the presence of French and Piedmontese troops. They resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of annexation by Piedmont of the central Italian states, and for annexation by France of Nice and Savoy.

Reference may be made to the accompanying map, which shows how Italian unity was achieved between 1859 and 1870.

   Stages of Italian Unification (left)


UNIFICATION OF SOUTHERN ITALY WITH THE NORTH

32. Re-emergence of Garibaldi. Only a little over half the peninsula had been won for the new Italy. Venetia, Rome and the Kingdom of Naples were not included.

In 1859 Garibaldi had returned from his borne on the island of Caprera to lead a guerrilla band for Piedmont in the Austrian War. In 1860 he commanded part of the forces of the revolutionary governments in central Italy. He proved to be somewhat unreliable, temperamental and impatient. There were fears that he might use a personal army he had been building to attack Venetia or Rome. He was infuriated at the cession of his native Nice to France and contemplated a raid on the ballot boxes to stop the plebiscite.

33. Unrest in southern Italy. The success of national movements in central Italy encouraged similar movements in the south. Francis 11 had become King of Naples in 1859 and contemplated reforms to retain control. The danger-spot from his point of view was Sicily.

It was not clear, however, what interpretation Sicilian rebel leaders would give to liberty and unity. In March 1860 Sicilian autonomists approached Cavour for his terms should they succeed in a revolt in the south, but Cavour gave no encouragement to them. Since the south was temperamentally so different from the north, Cavour wanted to avoid complications in the former area until the work of union had been consolidated in the latter.

Crispi, a subtle republican conspirator, incited the Sicilians to revolt on 4th April. It was clear that this revolt needed external aid for its success. He managed to divert the energies of Garibaldi to Sicily without officially encouraging him.

Garibaldi gathered a thousand picked volunteers at Genoa. Cavour refused to give public support, wanting to avoid a clash with Austria, and Garibaldi was prevented from getting recruits from the Piedmontese army or rifle supplies. The expedition, aboard two leaky steamers, made a successful landing at Marsala in Sicily on 11 th May. The Neapolitan garrison realised too late that Garibaldi's Red-shirt army had no connection with the British navy, which had turned up at the same time to enforce respect for British property.

34. Expedition of the Tbousand. The rapidity of events forced plebiscites would be held in all the areas concerned. He had no particular sympathy for the south and distrusted Garibaldi. However, he knew that Mazzini's agents were

active in the south and that unless he tried to mould events to his advantage republican and separatist ideas might succeed there.

Garibaldi gathered a thousand volunteers at Genoa. Cavour refused to give public support, wanting to avoid a clash with Austria, and Garibaldi was prevented from getting recruits from the Piedmontese army or rifle supplies. The expedition, aboard two leaky steamers, made a successful landing at Marshala in Sicily on 11th May. The Neapolitan garrison realised too late that Garibaldi’s Red-shirt army had no connection with the British navy, which had turned up at the same time to enforce respect for British property.

35. Conquest of Sicily. Garibaldi's ill-equipped army defeated the Neapolitans at Calatafini and he negotiated for their withdrawal to Naples. He gained thousands of recruits for his army and was helped by a rising in Palermo. By mid July he controlled the whole island. Cavour worried in case a republic was established, thus provoking intervention by the European powers. Though Garibaldi adopted the watchword of "Italy and Victor Emmanuel", Cavour had no faith as to the genuineness of Garibaldi's monarchical feelings or in his precipitate tactics.

36. Annexation of Naples and Sicily. On 18th August Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina. His progress on the mainland was triumphant, and resistance to him was negligible. King Francis was betrayed by many of his ministers and soldiers, and left Naples for Gaeta on 6th September. Garibaldi entered the city the next day.

The future was uncertain and Cavour decided it was time for Piedmont to take an official part in the drama. On 12th September he informed the powers that he was sending troops to the Papal States to re-establish order. He had the approval of Napoleon. His troops defeated the Papal army at Castelfidardo on the 18th and then pushed on into the Neapolitan kingdom. Cavour secured the consent of the Piedmontese Parliament for the annexation of southern Italy if this was approved by plebiscites. Garibaldi's forces had become involved in various engagements along the river Volturno. The Piedmontese invasion led to victory on 1st October. In February 1861 Gaeta fell and Francis II fled to Rome. Plebiscites held in the south in late 1860 registered large majorities for annexation by Piedmont. However, much pressure was put on voters to vote in this way and many southerners voted "yes" as signifying a return to settled government. Garibaldi handed over authority to King Victor Emmanuel and returned to Caprera.

37. Reasons for the Piedinontese invasion. Numerous factors prompted Cavour in his decision to send the army into the Papal States. His purpose was as follows.

(a) To regain the initiative for Piedmont. Cavour's political position was precarious since the cession of Nice and Savoy had been unpopular. Victor Emmanuel was also secretly working with Garibaldi. At the same time Garibaldi was gaining all the prestige and glory, and Cavour thought it politically unwise that his fame should completely overshadow that of the King.

(b) To prevent the occupation of Rome. It seemed that Garibaldi had no intention of handing over his command until he had conquered Rome, which would have provoked French or Austrian intervention. Cavour knew that Piedmontese troops could capture the Papal States while avoiding the occupation of Rome.

(c) To prevent the creation of a republic. Mazzini was in Naples and there was a strong party in favour of giving Naples and Sicily a separate and independent standing in a free and united Italy. Cavour had failed previously through his own agents to influence events there, and Garibaldi had refused to declare Sicily annexed to Piedmont. Cavour had no confidence in Garibaldi's ability to cope with the situation. There was even a faint possibility of a recovery by the supporters of the Bourbon monarchy.

(d) To forestall Austrian intervention. Cavour was anxious to achieve the fait accompli of annexation in the south before Austria was able to gain allies. He knew that Austria might well intervene if the Warsaw talks in October with Russia and Prussia were successful.

38. Non-intervention of the powers. The cause of Italian unity was helped by the rivalry of the powers, which prevented effective collaboration between them.

(a) Anglo-French rivalry. Both Britain and France suspected each other of trying to gain from the unrest in southern Italy.

(i) Napoleon, fearing a possible attack on Rome, proposed that a joint Anglo-French force should prevent Garibaldi crossing from Sicily to the mainland.

(ii) Cavour officially requested these powers to stop Garibaldi. He then sent a private envoy to Russell asking for no action to be taken.

(iii) Britain then said that the presence of French ships in the Straits of Messina would be resented. As the British navy was in the vicinity this indirectly helped Garibaldi to cross to Sicily without incident.

(b) October dispatch of Russell. British moral support for the Italian cause discouraged concerted action by the three eastern powers in Italy. In October, after plebiscites had been held in Naples and Sicily, Russell sent a famous dispatch to the European powers, which:

(i) stated that all states had the right to start revolutions similar to the 1688 revolution dethroning James II;

(ii) noted "the gratifying spectacle of a people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence".

(c) Austro-Prussian rivalry. Austria feared Piedmont might attack Venetia. She wanted to intervene in Italy but was anxious to reach an agreement with Prussia and Russia to protect her rear. Russia was prepared to give some moral assistance. However, Austria was not prepared to give concessions to Prussia in Germany to gain her support in Italy. Thus Prussia saw little to gain. Moreover, she wanted to remain on good terms with Britain over Schleswig-Holstein and with France.

Thus the meetings of the three eastern powers at Teplitz (July) and Warsaw (October) proved abortive on the Italian Question.

FINAL UNIFICATION, 1861-70

39. New Kingdom of Italy. After Villafranca Cavour had been determined to work for a unitary state. He opposed the federal concept of France and Austria. He gave Neapolitan and Sicilian leaders some hope that annexation would be followed by a large measure of autonomy for the south.

However, the Piedmontese began to impose a ruthless centralisation, ignoring many local customs and codes in the south. As a result the popularity which Victor Emmanuel had gained in Naples in November 1860 had almost disappeared by January 1861.

On 17th March 1861 the first Italian Parliament met in Turin and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel II King of Italy. The government was to be a limited constitutional monarchy based on the statuto of 1848 and a highly centralised one.

40. Death of Cavour. In June 1861 Cavour died, exhausted by his exertions, embittered by the attacks of Garibaldi and alarmed by his reports of unrest in the south. Cavour was himself partly responsible for the resurgence of trouble there, since he refused to adopt any administrative policy to allow for the acute differences between the south and the north. However, his death was a great blow to the new Italy. No future politician seemed capable of devising suitable policies for the centre and south, and Cavour might have prevented much of the chaos which was to follow in subsequent years.

41. Annexation of Venetia. The primary objective of Italian leaders became the acquisition of Venetia, but even the most skilful diplomacy could not get Austria to part with it voluntarily. In January 1866 Italy offered to purchase Venetia for 1,000 million lire. Francis Joseph appeared willing, but the military group at Court dissuaded him from a course which was considered contrary to Austria's honour.

In 1866 Italy allied with Prussia against Austria. Her army was defeated at Custozza and her navy at Lissa. However, Prussia was victorious, and Italy was rewarded for participating in the conffict by being granted Venetia.

42. Occupation of Rome. Cavour's last political act had been the securing of a parliamentary declaration that Rome should be the capital of Italy. As a resuit t most Italians regarded unification as incomplete as long as the city was not under their control. Events culminating in the occupation of Rome were as follows.

(a) In 1862 Garibaldi landed in Sicily without government support. He marched on Rome with his volunteers, but his forces were checked at Aspromonte by Piedmontese troops and dispersed. Napoleon told the Italians that it was impossible to withdraw French troops from Rome.

(b) A convention was settled in September 1864. Napoleon wanted to divert the Italians from Rome. It was agreed that French troops would be withdrawn if Italy guaranteed Papal territory and moved her capital to Florence within six months.

(c) The French garrison left Rome in December 1866. It got as far as Marseilles when news came in January that Garibaldi was making another attempt on Rome. It re-embarked and reached Italy in time to join the Papal troops to defeat Garibaldi at Mentana.

(d) On the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War the French troops garrisoned in Rome left. Italian troops then occupied the city.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, 1861-1914

43. Introduction. The new Italian state was formed in 1861, but serious internal problems remained, and new ones developed. The main problems, some of which were resolved successfully, were concerned with:

(a) relations between the north and south (see 44);

(b) finance (see 45);

(c) the creation of a stable political system (see 44 and 46);

(d) the preservation of law and order (see 47);

(e) the growth of socialism (see 47);

(f) the Roman Question. For relations between the government and the Vatican, see 60.

44. Differences between north and south. After political unification the problem of effective integration remained. D'Azeglio remarked: "We have made Italy; now we have to make Italians." Important social, economic, political and psychological differences continued to divide the people, and the south looked to the north with some degree of envy and dislike. The various problems were as follows.

(a) Economic. The north had the major share of the raw materials and industries, and a better soil and climate than the south. Consequently it had a higher standard of living. In the south there were virtually no industries, agricultural methods were old-fashioned, and the soil was poor and the climate dry,.

(b) Political. Many southerners who had hoped for a degree of autonomy for the south were unreconciled to control from Piedmont. This included the aristocracy, who largely retired from active political life to the feudal isolation of their estates, many remaining loyal to the Pope and the Bourbons.

Many of the Neapolitan peasants who voted in the plebiscites of 1860 were voting, not only for the first time in their lives, but also for the last time. Property and literacy qualifications for the vote excluded far more southerners after 1861 than Piedmontese. It was not until 1912 that universal manhood suffrage was adopted for those aged over thirty.

(c) Social. Italians in the south adopted different attitudes to those in the north and were content with a slower pace of life. Interests were primarily political (in a conspiratorial and manipulative sense). Vast industrial projects linked to a competitive economic system, though likely to help their problems, evoked little enthusiasm.

(d) Educational. Owing to the higher degree of poverty in the south, illiteracy was common. There was a higher standard of elementary education in the north. Not until 1877 was any provision made for public education, and then it was not enforced owing to the expense.

(e) Preservation of order. After the death of Cavour no politician seemed able to devise suitable social and economic programmes to meet the needs of the centre and the south. Free trade hardly seemed the answer, since it would depress the already struggling industries in the south. A combination of economic, social and political grievances soon led to a revival of brigandage and violence. The southerners hated taxation and conscription. Soon sixty battalions of troops were needed to quell civil war. in Sicily prolonged agitation led to a general revolt in 1866, when political forces of the Right and Left combined to defy the government. Secret societies, such as the Mafia, developed to terrorise the countryside.

45. Financial difficulties. Debts of the different states taken over by the new Italian kingdom were large. The nation also had to spend large sums on the army and navy and on public works, especially on the building of railways. In 1862 government receipts were found to meet only half of government expenditure. For several years there were large annual deficits, involving the need for new loans and increased taxation. In 1868 an excise duty was levied on corn passing through the mill. The high price of bread reduced many in the south to starvation level. Not until 1879 was financial stability achieved, with receipts exceeding expenditure.

46. Political instability and corruption. During the period 1871-1914 there were frequent changes of government. Weak leadership and numerous opposition factions gave little cohesiveness to the political system.

Loose coalitions of Right and Left existed, the former being strong in the industrial north and the latter in the south. However, ideological or sectional-affiliations were of less significance than the desire of deputies to gain office and retain it by any means possible. Many politicians nurtured on corruption in the south carried their methods into Parliament. Bribery and corruption., notably the buying of the votes of one or more factions (known as transformismo - opportunism), was freely engaged in by the political leaders. It was justified on the grounds of the impossibility of forming a government by any other means.

Generally Italians despised their parliamentarians as greedy hypocrites who seemed more concerned with local issues, petty intrigues and special interests than with important major economic and social issues. Depretis, Crispi and Giolitti, the outstanding names of the period 1871-1914, all practised the manipulation of votes and the rigging of elections.

47. Socialism and violence. During the 1890s socialist and anarchist sentiment grew among the workers and poorer groups. In 1893 there were serious peasant troubles in Sicily. In 1898 the army was called out to deal with widespread violence. In 1900 King Humbert was assassinated. During 1901-4 there was a series of strikes, riots and bomb-throwing incidents.

(a) Reasons for the growth of discontent.

(i) Disgust of the people with the political corruption practised by their leaders.

(ii) Lack of concern of the government with poverty and poor social conditions.

(iii) Lack of machinery for the airing of grievances in a legitimate fashion. Trade unions were not permitted. After 1894 severe laws were passed against anarchist and socialist organisations.

(iv) Colonial failures.

(v) Restricted franchise. It was not until 1912 that all men aged over thirty were allowed to vote.

(b) Reasons for the decrease in discontent. Socialist agitation and violence diminished after 1904, though people still disliked parliamentarianism as it was practised. Factors contributing to the decline of discontent were as follows.

(i) Social reforms: old-age pensions were introduced in 1898. Giovanni Giolitti, the left-wing Premier during most of the period 1901-14, introduced a number of social reforms. These included measures which improved factory conditions and public health, established national insurance and abolished child labour.

(ii) Harsh treatment of agitators: the government took forceful measures against all offenders against law and order. In 1898 martial law was proclaimed and heavy sentences were given by courts-martial. In 1902 the railway strikers were called up as reservists.

(iii) Influence of Pope Pius X: after 1903 he permitted Catholics to take part in political struggles involving the safety of the political order.

ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1870-1914

48. Great-power policy. Italy was basically a poor country with grave internal problems. The illiteracy rate was considerable and high taxes and low wages encouraged emigration. The country lacked essential raw materials such as coal and iron.

However, Italy's large population entitled her to rank as one of the smaller of the great European powers, and her political leaders wanted her to play an important international role. Exploits abroad were convenient, too, for distracting popular attention from ills at home. However, her military capability was weak. Bismarck once remarked that Italy had "poor teeth and such a large appetite".

Evidence of her desire for great-power status was shown in the following.

(a) Irredentist agitation (see 49).

(b) Colonial activities (see 50).

(c) The creation of a network of alliances (see 51-54).

(d) The building of a large army and navy.

49. irredentism. After 1870 the Italian government maintained a constant agitation for the following territories which were still under Austrian rule.

(a) The Trentino. In 1866 Venctia had been interpreted in a narrow sense. The Trentino (South Tyrol) contained 370,000 Italians under Austrian control. Austria had in effect a military outpost thrust deep into the heart of Italy. The region's industrial products were excluded from the Italian market. Clashes frequently occurred between Italian workers and Austrian officials in Trieste and the Trentino.

(b) Istria. In 1903 the Austrian authorities refused Italian subjects a separate university, and an anti-Austrian demonstration occurred in Fiume.

50. Colonialism. Italy was the one power whose European policy was largely dominated by colonial considerations. Italy had an expanding population, but many migrated to North and South America to improve their economic conditions. Italy desired to find her own territories abroad which would provide outlets for emigration, satisfy the rising ambitions of big business for markets and of the leaders for great-power status, and boost the nationalistic spirit. She had thoughts of reviving the glories of the ancient Roman Empire and of establishing an African colony on that "fourth shore".

Her activities were concerned with the following areas:

(a) Tunis. At first Italy had her eyes on this North African possession of Turkey. Her designs were thwarted by France in 1881.

(b) Ethiopia and the Red Sea.

(c) Tripoli. Eventually, in 1911, Italy achieved her aim at founding a North African empire in Tripoli.

51. The Triple Alliance. In 1882 Italy joined the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany, thus converting it into the Triple Alliance.

(a) Italy wanted an alliance for the following reasons.

(i) Fear of isolation: the Italians resented the French protectorate over Tunis (1881) and wanted allies to support her colonial ventures.

(ii) Desire to strengthen the position of the government against the Papacy: some Roman Catholics had been plotting with Austria to restore the Papacy's former power or for Austria to regain Venetia.

(iii) Need to fortify the monarchical principle: the King was alarmed at the continued evidence of republicanism in the country.

(b) Austria and Germany hoped that the alliance would prevent Italy from:

(i) attacking Austria in the rear if that power was involved in war with Russia;

(ii) forming an alliance with France or Britain. In actual fact Italy was to reach understandings with other powers which virtually made null and void her obligations in the Triple Alliance (see 52-54).

52. Friendship with Britain. Rudini, the Italian Premier in the 1890s, stated that Britain formed the cornerstone of Italy's other alliances. Economic considerations necessitated close links, since Britain provided valuable iron and coal to Italy. Evidence of Italian concern to maintain friendly relations with Britain can be seen from the following.

(a) The special reservations made in the Triple Alliance. When Italy joined the Triple Alliance in 1882, a protocol was added stating that that alliance was not directed against Britain. Though this was left out in the renewal treaties of 1887 and 1890, in the latter year provision was made to include Britain in the alliance if necessary. Italy made it clear that she would not support her allies against Britain.

(b) The Mediterranean agreement of 1887 with Britain and Austria. The three powers agreed to maintain the status quo in the Near East, the Turkish Straits and the Balkans. Italy was also promised the same sort of help in Tripoli as she might give Britain in Egypt. The agreement was aimed against France.

53. Co-operation with France. At first there was acute tension between the two countries. This was due to Italy's claims on Tunis, the Italian refusal to divulge the contents of the Triple Alliance, the tariff wars and French support of the Vatican.

However, France wished to detach Italy from her existing alliances and to break up the Mediterranean coalition. Relations improved gradually as a result of the following developments.

(a) Franco-Italian convention (1896). Italy recognised the French protectorate over Tunis in return for certain political and commercial privileges.

(b) Commercial treaty (1898). This ended the tariff war.

(c) Secret agreement (1900). Italy agreed to recognise French aspirations in Morocco in return for French recognition of Italian aims in Tripoli.

(d) Secret agreement (1902). Italy promised that she would remain neutral in any war in which France was involved. This meant that Italy would no longer help Germany in the event of a French attack, one of the original purposes of the Triple Alliance.

(e) Exchange visits. In 1903 Victor Emmanuel visited Paris, and in 1904 President Loubet visited Rome, where he received a great welcome.

54. Arrangements with Russia and Austria. In 1909 Italy made the following agreements with Russia and Austria which partly conflicted.

(a) The Racconigi agreement with Russia. In October, after the Bosnian crisis, Russia and Italy made an arrangement by which they agreed on the following points.

(i) As far as possible, they would both preserve the status quo in the Balkans and would not make agreements about that area with a third power without the participation of the other.

(ii) Russia would observe "benevolent neutrality" towards Italian designs in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

(iii) Italy would support Russia in her plans to open the Turkish Straits to her ships.

(b) The agreement with Austria. The provision in (a)(i) above was aimed against Austria and hence was contrary to Italian commitments in the Triple Alliance. A few days later Italy balanced it with an agreement with Austria. This stipulated that neither would make agreements with a third party without the knowledge of the other.

55. Observations on Italian foreign Policy. As Italy was not quite a great power, she tried to occupy an indeterminate position between the powers. The following points can be made for and against her policy.

(a) The secret and inconsistent promises in Italy's alliance arrangements made nonsense of the whole system. Italy found the obligations to various countries difficult to reconcile.

(b) Italy failed to give consistent support to her allies.

(i) In 1906 at Algeciras. she supported France and Britain against Germany.

(ii) She made it clear to Germany that in any war between France or Britain and Germany she would not consider herself bound.

(c) Italy acted as a restraining influence to prevent major war. This was illustrated in her policy during the Algeciras Conference of 1906, and during the Balkan crises of 1906, 1909 and 1912-13 when she worked to hold back the warlike pretensions of Austria.

The Papacy

56. The eclipse of the Papacy after the French Revolution. In 1796 French armies invaded Papal territories, and in 1798 the French created the Roman Republic. The Pope, Pius VI, was taken to southern France. In 1801 a new Pope, Pins VII, concluded a Concordat with France and was given back most of his former territories. This, however, was not the end of the conffict between France and the Papacy. As a result of Pius's refusal to join the Continental System, the Papal States were declared incorporated into France in 1809. The Pope replied by excommunicating Napoleon, whereupon he was arrested by the Emperor.

57. Restoration of Catholic power. After 1815 the Papacy recaptured much of the ground lost during the period 1789-1815. The Papal territories were restored and there was a revival of Catholicism in Europe. In Protestant states, specially among the governing classes, sympathy grew for the Catholic Church as a mainstay against the disruptive tendencies of liberalism and nationalism.

The Pope's position was strengthened by influential writings which glorified the Catholic Church. An example of such works was Joseph de Maistre's Du Pape (1817). After 1848 the middle classes in Europe also became acutely aware of the rising influence of socialist ideas among the working classes. Men of property saw priests of the Catholic Church as the "spiritual gendarmes" who might guard the populace against the infection of "social heresies". Pope Pins IX, threatened with the loss of temporal sovereignty, sought compensation by strengthening the influence of the Papacy. He concluded advantageous Concordats with Spain in 1851 and Austria m 1855. Roman Catholic hierarchies were re-established in Britain in 1850 and Holland in 1853.

58. Opposition of the Vatican to contemporary ideas. The growth of nationalism, in particular in Italy, threatened the Pope's temporal power. In addition, many nineteenth-century developments appeared to threaten the spiritual power of the Pope. As a result the Vatican steadily opposed all modem ideas.

(a) Nationalism. Catholics tended to support the nationalist cause in the Polish and Belgian rebellions of 1830 and they animated much of the Irish resistance to Britain. However, Pope Gregory XVI ordered the clergy to support the established governments. For the role of the Pope in the Italian risings of 1830 and 1848, see 3(c), 6 and 9.

(b) Liberalism. In 1830 a French priest, Felicitie de Lamennais, founded a paper called L'Avenir and campaigned for freedom of education, the press and worship. In 1832 the Pope issued an encyclical, the Bull Mirari Vos, which condemned liberty of conscience and the press, and stated that revolt for any reason against established governments was intolerable.

(c) General progress. An example of modern trends disliked by the Church was the theories propounded by Charles Darwin in his Origin of Species (1859). His account of the descent of man from the lowest animals seemed to render untenable the Biblical account of life and to deprive man of the immortal soul bestowed on the race of Adam.

In the Syllabus of Error (1864) the Pope reaffirmed his opposition to nationalism and liberalism, and to many of the current ideas and movements in science and politics. He declared that it was an error to assume that the Pope ought to agree with the trends of "modem civilisation".

59. Doctrine of Papal infallibility. In July 1870, at the time of the impending downfall of the Pope's temporal authority, the Vatican Council stated that, when pronouncing ex cathedra on matters of faith and morals, the Pope speaks with final and supernatural authority. Catholic bishops were empowered to punish those who refused compliance with such pronouncements by excommunication, expulsion or refusal to perform the marriage ceremony.

This was an attempt to exalt the Papacy above all secular states and to extend "faith and morals" to the political sphere. It resulted in the following.

(a) Considerable dissension within the Catholic Church.

(b) An outbreak of a feud between the Vatican and many European governments. In particular Austria annulled the Concordat of 1855 in 1867 and Bismarck pursued the Kulturkampf in Germany.

60. Relations between Italy and the Vatican. In 1861 Cavour failed to induce Pope Pins IX to abandon his claims to temporal power. After the Piedmontese invasion, the Papal States became part of the new Italy. In September 1870 the Italian troops entered Rome on the withdrawal of the French.

Relations between the Italian government and the Vatican were fixed for many years by the policies adopted by each during the period 1871-4.

(a) Policy of the Italian government. The government tried to carry out Cavour's idea of "a free Church in a free State". In 1871 the Italian Parliament passed the "Law of Guarantees". Its provisions were:

(i) the recognition of the Pope as an independent sovereign of the Vatican state within the city of Rome, and in possession of the Vatican and Lateran Palaces;

(ii) the offer of an annual income of _129,000 in compensation for the loss of his possessions, and the grant of exemption from tax to his state.

(b) Policy of the Vatican. The Pope refused to accept the Law of Guarantees and regarded himself a "prisoner" of the government. He refused to recognise the new Italy, and this created religious disunity. In the Bull Non Expedit (1874) he ordered Catholics not to vote in general elections. This was generally ignored, but it meant that for many years devout Catholics wore prevented from contributing to political life.

61. Policies of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903). He opposed liberal and national ideas alike. He made little change to the political principles of Pius IX, and insisted that the Church should superintend every form of secular life. However, he was more tolerant than his predecessor and he perceived that democracy might prove as useful as monarchy for preserving Catholic principles, though he did not want to advocate any particular form of government.

(a) Relations with Germany and France.

(i) After 1878 relations were improved with Germany, where the anti-clerical legislation was gradually repealed.

(ii) As relations between the Vatican and the Italian government remained poor, the Pope wanted to secure French aid foi the solution of the Roman Question. After 1870 the French government had steadfastly supported the Vatican in its domestic struggle with the government but had also passed a number of anti-clerical measures at home. In 1890 Leo made a deliberate effort to improve his relations with France by instructing French Catholics to break with monarchical principles and support the Republic. He encouraged the policy of the Ralliement of 1890. The Tsar, contemplating a Russo-French alliance, accepted the Pope's judgement that the French Third Republic was permanent.

(b) Encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891). This was an attempt to apply Christian principles to the relations between capital and labour. It stated that a worker had the right to a just wage sufficient to allow him and his family to live properly and that employers had important moral duties to perform.

62. Pope Pius X. This Pope was less prone to compromise with the forces of secularism than his predecessor. Relations between the Vatican and the Italian state improved but Vatican-French relations became worse.

(a) France.

(i) The Pope quarrelled with the French government over the appointment of bishops.

(jj) The Pope denounced the visit of President Loubet of France to the Italian King in 1904 as "a grave offence to a sovereign pontiff". As a result, the French government increased the severity of the anti-clerical laws and ended the Condordat.

(iii) The anti-clerical laws were condemned by the Pope in the encyclical Vehementer. Modernism was denounced as a heresy and in 1908 the French Catholic priest, Alfred Loisy, a scholar, was excommunicated. Many of his works wore already on the Index of Prohibited Books.

(b) Italy. In 1904 the Pope was asked by some laymen if they could take part in the elections to keep out the socialists. He replied, "Do as your conscience dictates." As a result, two clerical members were elected to the Italian legislature and the, socialists lost six seats.

Note: Relations between the Vatican and the Italian government were not regularised until the Lateran Treaty of 1929.

Revision Questions

1.  What were the main political units in Italy after 1815? (1)

2. Why was no attempt made in 1815 to promote Italian unity? (1, 2)

3. Discuss the various suggestions made as to the future Italian state. (2(c))

4. Estimate the influence of Austria in Italian affairs before 1833. (1,3)

5. Mention the factors which contributed to greater Italian unity between 1815 and 1848. (4, 5)

6. Estimate the importance of Mazzini in stimulating Italian nationalism before 1848. (5)

7. Was Pope Pius IX a liberal? (6)

8. What were the areas of revolt in 1848? (7)

9. Account for the collapse of the 1848 revolts. (943)

10. Why did Piedmont become the hope of the Italian liberals after 1848? (15)

11. Explain how Cavour planned to promote Italian unity. Illustrate your answer with events from the period 1850-6. (16-18,20)

12. Describe Napoleon Ill's interests in Italy. (19)

13. What arrangements were made by Cavour and Napoleon during 1858-9? (22)

14. Did Cavour provoke Austria into war in 1860? (24-26)

15. Why did Napoleon decide to make peace with Austria without consulting Cavour? What were the provisions of the Peace of Villafranca? Why were they unenforceable? (28-30)

16. Discuss the role of Britain in assisting Italian unity in the years 1859-61. (30(d), 38(a)-(b))

17. What contribution did Garibaldi make towards aiding Italian unity? (32, 34-36, 42)

18. Why did Piedmont invade the Papal States in 1860? (37)

19. What problems concerning Italian unity remained after Cavour's death? (39, 41-44, 49)

20. Account for the political instability in Italy after 1870. (44-47)

21. What did Italy hope to achieve in foreign affairs after 1870? To what extent was she successful? (48-55)

22. Discuss the influence of the Vatican in European affairs between 1815 and 1905. (57-59, 61)

23. Why were relations between the Italian government and the Vatican poor after 1871 ? (60)

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